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A Mathematical Model of Influence 
of the Interaction between Civilization 
Center and Barbarian Periphery 
on the World System Development* 
 
Andrey V. Korotayev and Leonid E. Grinin 
 
Abstract 
This article offers an analysis and mathematical modeling of the influence of 
one of the major factors of the World System macrodynamics throughout most 
part of its history (since the ‘urban revolution’) – the factor of interaction of 
civilizations with their barbarian periphery. The proposed mathematical model 
is intended to describe possible influence of interaction between civilizational 
core of the World System and its barbarian periphery on the formation 
of the specific curve of the world urbanization dynamics. It simulates comple-
tion of the phase transition, behavior of the system in the attraction basin and 
beginning of the phase transition to the attraction basin of the new attractor 
and is aimed to identify the role of the factor of interaction between the civiliza-
tional core and barbarian periphery in the formation of attractor effect during 
the completion of phase transition, that is for clarification of the reason 
why there was observed not only slowdown of growth rates of the main indica-
tors of the World System development after completion of phase transitions 
during its development, but also their falling with the subsequent temporary 
stabilization near some equilibrium level. Achievements of modern barbarolo-
gy, including the understanding of complexity of the barbarian periphery itself 
and its heterogeneity are considered. The basic principle of the proposed dy-
namic model is that sizes, power and level of complexity in realization of exter-
nal policy functions in nomadic unions (empires) closely correspond to sizes, 
power and level of political culture and activity of the core states with which 
nomads constantly had to do (this point has been established in works of the 
known experts in nomadic studies). Various alternatives are shown in the mo- 
del, when depending on power and size of one of the two components of the 
                                                          
* The research is supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (Project No. 17-06-
00464). 
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system ‘civilization – barbarian periphery’ studied by us, another one also 
changes significantly as it has to respond to the challenge properly, or can 
make less efforts feeling no threat or resistance. This principle is observed 
throughout the long period of the history of the World System. It is shown that 
interaction between the civilizational center and barbarian periphery really 
can explain some characteristic features of the World System dynamics in the 
4th millennium BCE – the 2nd millennium CE. The ways of further development 
of the model are outlined. 
Keywords: dynamic modeling, the World System, civilizations, barbarian 
periphery, urbanization, asabiyyah, technology, warfare.   
The emergence and development of the world urban network was one of the 
main components of the World System's evolution that accelerated its devel-
opment and increased its integration. Not without reason V. Gordon Childe 
focused on the urban revolution (Childe 1952: Chapter 7; Childe 1956). It is 
also quite clear that the processes of functional differentiation, social stratifica-
tion and class formation proceeded in many ancient agricultural societies under 
a considerable influence of the ‘urban revolution’ (Alekshin 1986: 22). The city 
also implies a complex concentration of geographical, social, political, and sa-
cral resources and assets. ‘The city is a direct territorial concentration of multi-
ple heterogeneous forms of human activities’ (Akhiezer 1995: 23). One can see 
the closest connection between urbanization, on the one hand, and the for-
mation and development of civilizations and statehood, on the other.1 
As is known, relatively large pioneer settlements (like Jericho in Palestine) 
vaguely resembling cities, emerged more than 9,000 years ago. In particular, 
about 7200 BCE Jericho was surrounded by a stone wall three meters thick, and 
four meters high (Lamberg-Karlovsky and Sablov 1992: 75). In the 7th – 6th 
millennia BCE, a number of settlements with estimated population of about 
2,000 people appeared in Western Asia (Ain Ghazal, Beisamoun, Beida, Abu 
Hureira, Çatal Hüyük). However, it is undisputable that the first real cities ap-
peared only in the 5th – 4th millennia BCE. And, finally, the first period of 
a rapid urban growth within the World System occurred between the second 
half of the 4th and the first half of the 3rd millennium BCE.  
Our previous research (Korotayev 2006c, 2007a, 2007b; Korotayev, Ko-
marova, and Khaltourina 2007: 169–177; Korotayev and Grinin 2012, 2013; 
Grinin 2017a, 2017b) has shown that the curve describing the dynamics of 
the world urban population has a rather peculiar form (see Figs 1 and 2).  
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Korotayev and Grinin 2006, 2007; Grinin 2007a; Masson 1989. This situation was typical 
for many regions: Ancient Greece (Gluskina 1983: 36; see also Frolov 1986: 44; Andreev 1979: 
20–21); Mesopotamia, in particular in the late 4th millennium and the 3rd millennium BCE (Dya-
konov 2000: 46), a number of African regions; e.g., in South East Madagascar in the 17th century 
a few small Betsileo states originated in this way (Kottak 1980; Claessen 2000, 2002, 2004).  
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Fig. 1. The World Urban Population Dynamics (in millions), for cities 
with > 10,000 inhabitants (logarithmic scale)  
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Fig. 2. Dynamics of the World Urbanization Index (proportion of 
population living in the cities with population more than 
10,000 inhabitants in the in the overall population of the 
world, with a projection of modern trends (logarithmic scale) 
As can be seen, one can single out here three rather distinct periods of relatively 
fast world urban population growth: (A1) from the mid-4th millennium BCE to 
the mid-3rd millennium BCE, (A2) the 1st millennium BCE (roughly corre-
sponding to the ‘Axial Age’); and (A3) the 19th – 21st centuries CE. Moreover, 
one can note two periods of relatively slow growth of the world urban popu- 
lation (including long phases when the urban population and the world urbani-
zation level would hardly grow or could even considerably fall): (B1) from the 
mid-3rd millennium BCE to the late 2nd millennium BCE and (B2) between 
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the 1st and 18th centuries CE. Two other periods turn out to be essentially close 
to these epochs: Period (B0) immediately preceding the mid-4th millennium 
(when the world urban population did not grow simply because cities had not 
appeared yet and no cities existed on the Earth), and Period (B3) that is ex-
pected to begin in the 22nd century, when, according to forecasts, the world ur-
ban population will again stop growing in any significant way (since the World 
System urbanization is supposed to reach the saturation level along with the 
stabilization of the world population) (see, e.g., Korotayev, Malkov, and 
Khaltourina 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Korotayev, Komarova, and Khaltourina 2007; 
Korotayev 2008, 2009, 2012, 2013; Grinin 2006a, 2006b).  
Note that the detected world urbanization dynamics correlates rather well 
with the dynamics of the World System political organization (Grinin and Ko-
rotayev 2006, 2007; Korotayev and Grinin 2007, 2012, 2013; Grinin 2016a, 
2016b; Grinin, Ilyin, and Andreev 2016). Moreover, the above mentioned syn-
chronous phase transitions to the new levels of the world urbanization and new 
complexity levels of the World System political organization temporally coin-
cide with phase transitions to higher levels of the World System political cen-
tralization that were detected by Taagepera and that took place, according to his 
calculations, during periods А1, А2 and А3 (Taagepera 1997: 485). 
Similar phase transitions appear to be observed with respect to the world 
literacy macrodynamics. In fact, during Period A1 we observe the emergence of 
the first literate people whose share in the world population by the end of this 
period had reached the level of decimals of a percent and fluctuated at this level 
during Period В1. And it is no coincidence. Although literate people could live 
not only in cities, nevertheless, their number in cities was incomparably larger 
than in rural areas. During Period А2, the world literacy rate grew by an order 
of magnitude and amounted to several percent of the world total population; it 
fluctuated at this level during Period B2 till the late 18th century when Period 
A3 started. During that period the world literacy level reached the level of doz-
ens percent, and by the beginning of Period B3 (presumably in the 22nd century) 
it is likely to stabilize at the hundred-percent level (see, e.g., Korotayev 2006d; 
Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a, 2006b). 
In fact, the above-mentioned phase transitions can be regarded as different 
aspects of a series of unified phase transitions: Phase Transition A1 from medi-
um complexity agrarian societies to complex agrarian ones, Phase Transi- 
tion A2 from complex agrarian societies to supercomplex ones, and, final- 
ly, Phase Transition A3 from supercomplex agrarian societies to postin- 
dustrial ones (within this perspective, the period of industrial societies turns 
out to be a period of phase transition В2 – В3). These phase transitions are also 
exceptionally strongly connected with production revolutions and transitions 
from one principle of production to another (see in more detail: Grinin 2003a, 
2007а, 2007b; Korotayev and Grinin 2006, 2007). The period of the first attrac-
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tor (the first phase), in particular, is connected with the first variant of the in-
tensive phase of agrarian revolution (transition to irrigation agriculture); the 
second attractor/phase – with the second variant of the intensive phase of agrar-
ian revolution (transition to intensive plow non-irrigation agriculture). From the 
16th to the first half of the 20th century (especially the 19th – the first half of 
the 20th century) the phase transition was connected with the transition to the 
industrial principle of production. The period from the end of the 20th century 
and (presumably) the whole 21st century is connected with the transition to sci-
entific and information/cybernetic principle of production (for more details see 
Grinin 2006a, 2006b; Grinin L., Grinin A., and Korotayev 2017a, 2017b).  
The proposed mathematical model aims at analyzing the possible impact of 
the interaction between the World System's civilizational core and its barbari-
an2 periphery on the formation of a specific curve of the world urbanization 
dynamics. It describes the completion of the phase transition, system's be- 
havior in the basin of attraction, and the start of the phase transition to 
a new basin of attraction. This model also identifies the role of the interaction 
between civilizational core and barbarian periphery in the formation of the at-
tractor effect during the completion of phase transition. In other words, we try 
to find out why after the phase transitions were completed there was observed 
not only the slow-down in the growth rates of the main indicators of the World 
System development but also their decline with subsequent temporary stabiliza-
tion at some equilibrium level (let us note that the offered model cannot de-
scribe the fluctuations observed at the respective levels). 
The issues of coexistence, interaction and struggle between civilization and 
barbarian periphery are extremely important for understanding of the evolution 
of the World System over the last five thousand years after the emergence of 
the first states and civilizations. This also remained relevant up to some extent 
for the Modern Period up until very recent times. In some regions, like, for ex-
ample, the Middle East and North Africa, the non-state tribal and chiefdom 
forms of political organization continued coexisting, competing or cooperating 
in the military field with the states up to the early 20th century. In particular, 
even in the territory of Egypt, one of the most ancient civilizations, in the sec-
ond half of the 18th century the Bedouin raids were a great threat for sedentary 
populations (as evidenced by the famous Egyptian historical chronicler of the 
late 18th and the early 19th centuries Аbd ar-Rahman al-Jabarti [1978]). In the 
middle of the 20th century within the territory of another most ancient, Chinese, 
civilization one could find a true internal barbarian periphery which made regu-
                                                          
2 Needless to say that, following Lewis H. Morgan (1877) tradition, we use the term ‘barbarian’ as 
a purely technical one – devoid of any pejorative implications (note that Morgan himself in no 
way despised the ‘barbarians’ – he – in company with Friedrich Engels [1884/1978] – rather ad-
mired them).  
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lar incursions into the center.3 One can recollect a similar situation in the Cau-
casus in the 19th and even in the 20th centuries.4 
As is known, there are great differences in the definition of civilization 
(see, e.g., Grinin 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Grinin and Korotayev 2008: In-
troduction). In this paper we operationalize civilization or civilizational core 
(center) of the World System as the societies of the World System core with 
urban settlements; while the peripheral communities without urban settlements 
are defined as ‘barbarian’. Within the framework of the present mathematical 
model the existence of cities is assumed to be the only formal characteristic of 
civilization.5 
As Vera P. Budanova (2002: 168) notes, there are some directions in mod-
ern barbarology which study general relations between barbarian world and 
civilization (see, e.g., Budanova 1990, 1994, 2000, 2002; Masson 1986, 1989; 
Barfield 2006, 1991; Kradin 1992, 2001а, 2001b; Kradin and Bondarenko 
2002; Pershits and Khazanov 1978; Khazanov 1975, 2002, 2006; Sannikov 
2002, 2003, 2005; Kradin, Bondarenko, and Barfield 2003; Grinin and Korota-
yev 2013, 2014, 2018). Nevertheless, it is a very broad subject, and many of its 
aspects are hardly well scrutinized. Still, the following conclusions drawn by 
barbarologists are especially important for our subject: 1) the center and barba- 
rian periphery are considered as closely related elements of a single pan-
                                                          
3 E.g., the Yi people (or Nuosu people) in the high mountain region of Liangshan of China's Sichuan 
province. There were four ‘classes’ in this society, one of which (actually [Nuosu] – ‘black’) con-
trary to subordinate ‘whites’ was superior, noble, and therefore it did not participate in productive 
labor. The rest three classes were in different degree of dependence – from semi-bond to slavish 
against the background of the absence of any developed political structure (Its and Yakovlev 
1967; Kubbel' 1988: 241–242). Such a situation developed from the 7th – 9th centuries CE after 
the cattle breeding tribes had subordinated farmers (Its and Yakovlev 1967: 79). Slavery was 
widespread in this society. Herewith the Nuosu often attacked and captured the Han people, re-
ducing them to slavery. Thus, in 1919 the Liangshan Yi people captured and took away more than 
10,000 people from neighboring counties to their highlands. In the early 19th century the total 
population of the Liangshan Yi was rather small, numbering about 10,000 people. But in 1838 it 
amounted already 40–50,000, and in 1910 – about 200–300,000. It continued to increase, having 
reached 630,000 people in the mid-1950s, among whom non-assimilated Han slaves totaled 
50,000–60,000 (Ibid.: 79–80). 
4 E.g., the General Anton Denikin in his History of the Civil Strife in Russia (Denikin 1993: 122) 
speaks about the Ingush as the most organized among the Caucasian peoples who took advantage 
of the anarchy during the Civil War and systematically plundered and terrorized all the neighbors. 
In fact, the most recent events in the Caucasus in Russia still remind us ‘living vestiges’ of such 
relationships between civilization and barbarian peripheries.  
5 The identification of this characteristic as a working criterion of civilization within our mathemat-
ical model should, of course, be treated just as an assumption and is explained by the necessity to 
determine in an operationalizable way within the present formal/mathematical research the socie-
ties forming the World-System core and having urban settlements as distinct from peripheral so-
cieties (designated here as ‘barbarous’) lacking those settlements. Let us note that it does not con-
tradict some researchers' rather fair statements that in the context of their research this characteris-
tic can be substituted, e.g., by the presence of monumental buildings (see, e.g., Masson 1989).  
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Oecumene system (= the World System) in which peoples with different levels 
of socio-cultural complexity interact (see, e.g., Pershits and Khazanov 1978: 4; 
Budanova 2002: 168); 2) within the barbarian periphery itself a certain cen- 
ter6 – a ‘core’ of the barbarian world – can be formed in relation to civilization, 
which in many respects defines relationships between civilization and barbari-
ans and with that part of barbarians who inhabited territories that were distant 
from the civilization core (the emergence of such centers, as a result of the civi-
lizational core pressure quite often led to the growth of collective solidarity 
[asabiyyah] of barbarians that we try to account for in our model); 3) the com-
plexity level of the barbarian alliances (especially among the nomads) closely 
corresponds to the size and level of political culture of states with which they 
were in contact (see, e.g., Barfield 2006); and 4) foreign policy and economic 
(trade) interests played a significant role in the relations between barbarian 
world and civilization, however, military contacts prevailed there (Budanova 
2000, 2002; Kradin 1992, 2001а; Barfield 1991, 2006).  
Elsewhere we have already analyzed the possible role of interaction be-
tween the civilizational core and barbarian periphery (see Korotayev, Malkov, 
and Khaltourina 2007: 189–208; Grinin 2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2011; Grinin and 
Korotayev 2013, 2014, 2018; Grinin et al. 2004, 2006) and considered the rea-
sons of an essential decline (up to negative values) of the growth rates of the 
main indicators of the World System development in the 1st millennium CE 
after the completion of А2 phase transition to supercomplex agrarian societies 
(Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006b; Zinkina, Ilyin, and Korotayev 
2017). Note that the above-mentioned analysis allowed identifying that factor 
as one of very important causes (but not the only one) of the considered phe-
nomenon. Thus, we have come to the following preliminary conclusions: 
The fact that the regime of hyperbolic growth changed after the World 
System's political centralization had reached critically high level of hy-
perbolic rates (in the early 1st millennium CE the absolute majority of 
World System's inhabitants turned out to be under control of only four 
empires – Roman, Parthian, Kushan and Han) is not accidental also for 
some other reasons. The rapid growth of political centralization in the 
1st millennium BCE was driven by the diffusion of iron metallurgy (for 
more details see Grinin and Korotayev 2008: Ch. 6; Korotayev and 
Zinkina 2017; Zinkina, Ilyin, and Korotayev 2017), which not only con-
siderably increased the Earth's carrying capacity, but also led to the de-
velopment of production of rather cheap and effective weapons which 
promoted the formation of numerous armies without which the emer-
gence of the world empires would be almost impossible. However, this 
process had important side effects. The politically centralized systems 
                                                          
6 At the same time in those barbarian polities such leaders would constantly change (Budanova 
2002).  
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quite often secure military superiority through the development of spe-
cialized military subsystems – rather small but well trained and profes-
sional armies. However, to preserve this superiority there is necessary to 
have monopoly on certain effective types of weapons (war chariots, 
bronze weapons, etc.). If the revolution in production of means of vio-
lence takes place and the monopoly on them cannot be efficiently sup-
ported (e.g., in case of emergence of iron weapons), the less politically 
centralized societies with a high proportion of military active population 
get considerable advantage and in military terms can become stronger 
than politically centralized societies. This was the case in many parts of 
Oecumene of the Old World in late antiquity. Moreover, less politically 
centralized societies with a greater share of military active population 
could considerably increase their military efficiency without noticeable 
increase in their political centralization or internal differentiation, for ex-
ample, through nomadization, growth of specialization on cattle breed-
ing since the herder's everyday work and the character of his socializa-
tion make him a combat-effective warrior. Nomadic cattle breeding with 
a widespread use of herders-riders could considerably increase military 
potential of such societies without additional political centralization and 
functional differentiation. In this context it is important for us that the 
side effect of the technological shifts of the first millennium BCE was 
strengthening of the barbarian periphery's military potential in general 
and nomadic socio-political systems, in particular... As a result, the no-
mads got a consistent military superiority over the settled societies 
throughout most part of the ‘Junior Hyperbole’ epoch (additionally 
strengthened by the invention and diffusion of stirrups and sabers); this 
led to an additional reduction in the World System's demographic 
growth rates not only due to mass depopulations resulting from recurring 
nomadic invasions, but also as a result of some decrease in the Earth’s 
carrying capacity in many important zones of the World System due to 
the pressure of barbarian (and, in particular, nomadic) peripheries (here 
we could recollect the Russian ‘bread-basket’ – Black Earth region 
which through the most part of the 2nd millennium was known as the 
Wild Field since the lands in this region were almost not cultivated be-
cause of the threat of nomadic raids) (Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltou-
rina 2007: 207–208).  
Let us note that a systematic military superiority at a certain phase of the 
World System evolution does not mean a constant superiority. China, for ex-
ample, defeated the Xiongnu a few times, carrying out deep raids in their lands 
(see, e.g., Gumilev 1993; Kradin 2001a), similar as the Russian dukes did with 
respect to the lands of Cumans (see, e.g., Rybakov 1966a: 561–562). Therefore, 
we actually deal with an unsteady balance of forces between the barbarian pe-
riphery and civilizational center but this balance could change under some cir-
cumstances. In a certain situation, the barbarian periphery's pressure would 
come over civilization or, vice versa, civilization would invade the barbarian 
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periphery. Thus, one can speak about certain cycles when phases of civiliza-
tional center's expansion and the barbarian periphery retreat are alternated by 
the phases of barbarian periphery expansion and civilizational center's retreat.  
It is worth mentioning that depending on the power and scale of one of the 
two components of ‘civilization – barbarian periphery’ system, the other element 
would also significantly change to give an adequate response to the amplified (or 
changing in some other way) challenge; otherwise, feeling no threat or resistance 
it can make less efforts. Anyway, it was noticed, that in nomadic alliances (em-
pires) the size, power and complexity level of foreign policy functions correlated 
closely with the size, power and level of political culture and activity of the sta- 
tes with which the nomads constantly interacted (see, e.g., Barfield 2006: 429). 
This can also explain the situation described below in the model, when a civili-
zation expands to the barbarian periphery rather actively, while the latter is una-
ble to actively resist the former. It may happen because the barbarian periphery 
turns unable to adapt to the power and size of the advancing civilization yet. 
After absorbing the part of the barbarian periphery which is less capable to re-
sist, especially the territories with environment, suitable for the civilization's 
economic expansion (and with peoples who are somehow ready to become 
a part of civilization), civilization can face more persistent representatives 
of the periphery especially those living under marginal conditions. As a result, 
the above-mentioned dynamic equilibrium can be established for certain periods 
(sometimes for a rather long time). 
Although a rather long coexistence of civilization and barbarian periphery 
is obvious, each part of this dynamic system tries to weaken or even destroy 
the other at every opportunity, so there emerges a situation of ‘interdiffusion’ 
when various innovations are borrowed (mostly by the barbarians from civiliza-
tion, but sometimes vice versa) and also civilization uses the barbarians for its 
own needs. As a result one can observe an accelerated development of the bar-
barian periphery which in order to have advantages and resist civilization tries 
to develop similar political and social forms. This usually aims primarily at 
achieving a military balance or military superiority, and also at achieving the 
parity of prestige. This also involves ideology which can be rather developed 
among the barbarians. The latter is important for understanding of the asabiy-
yah concept which was developed by an outstanding medieval Arab thinker 
Аbd ar-Rahman Ibn Khaldūn as a scientific category (Ibn Khaldūn 1958, 2004) 
and introduced into the scientific vocabulary of modern Cliodynamics by Peter 
V. Turchin (2003, 2007) who, in our opinion, quite reasonably interprets this 
concept as ‘collective solidarity’. 
It is a peculiar ideology of tribal solidarity, which allows uniting barbarian 
people into powerful military force, for example, when putting together groups 
of tribes. Therefore, Morton Fried (1967) has reason to state that tribes are 
the secondary non-primitive formations emerging under the influence of neigh-
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boring communities with significantly higher level of sociocultural complexity 
(see also Korotayev 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2003, 2004, 2006b, 
2006c; Grinin 2007a). In fact, many analogue forms of polities of the ‘main 
sequence’ are often secondary phenomena associated with the impact of civili-
zational center, or their development is significantly modified being effected by 
more developed neighbors (see Grinin 2007a). For example, such a modifica-
tion might have happened in the development of the Scythian polity since the 
Scythians actively communicated with the Medians and Persians, and later with 
Greeks (see, e.g., Dyakonov 1956; Khazanov 1975). Moreover, such forms 
quite often emerge just because they best fit the marginal environment, while 
civilizations, as a rule, emerge in the environment more favorable for the de-
velopment of intensive production. It is natural that the analogues in barbarian 
periphery possessing certain environmental, economic and demographic fea-
tures could get along without cities. Only some barbarians had a developed 
system of cities as it was in Gaul where there were up to a thousand of ‘genuine 
cities’, and in some of them population reached tens thousands people 
(Shkunaev 1989: 134, 143). The size of some cities was 100 and more hectares, 
and they were secured by powerful walls (see Filip 1961: 116–129; Mongait 
1974: 248–253).  
Thus, due to interaction of different kind between civilization and barbari-
an periphery: a) the World System expanded and became more and more com-
plex7; b) the socio-political, economic and cultural level of the barbarian pe-
riphery generally increased; c) the civilizational level, including urbanization, 
could temporarily decrease due to generally increasing size of the World Sys-
tem, and temporal ‘barbarization’ of extensive territories as it was repeatedly 
observed in the 1st millennium CE (especially in Europe).8 One can apply here 
Adolf Leo Oppenheim's idea (1990: 88) about constant counteraction between 
anti- and pro-urbanistic trends in ancient Mesopotamia and in the ancient world 
in general, while the barbarian periphery was the most important agent of the 
former trend.  
It is also worth mentioning that when speaking about each certain barbari-
an onslaught towards the civilizational zone, as well as about definite periods of 
such mass movement, we can hardly know the exact reasons that launched such 
migrations. For example, Budanova (2000: 5–6) writes that there is still no def-
inite answer to the question what triggered the migration engaging territories 
                                                          
7 This may have involved the integration of a number of civilized societies by barbarian conquerors. 
We think that the Mongolian amalgamation is one of the most significant in this context since for 
a certain period it strengthened the relations within the World System from the Pacific Ocean to 
the Atlantic (see, e.g., Abu-Lughod 1989, 1990).  
8 One can also assume that the World System expansion rate could be sometimes inversely propor-
tional to the rate of quality growth of its particular parts and processes (such as urbanization).  
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from Scandza to Mauritania, from China to the Pyrenees in the Great Migration 
Period (the 3rd – 7th centuries CE).9  
Here we present the model which is founded on the above-described ideas, 
and also on our earlier general models of development of the World System 
(Korotayev 2005, 2006c, 2006d, 2007a, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2013; Korotayev, 
Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a, 2007; Korotayev and Malkov 2012; Korota-
yev and Zinkina 2017; Grinin 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2010; Grinin and Grinin 
2015, 2016) and some ideas of the theory of dynamics of community solidarity 
(asabiyyah) formulated by Peter Turchin (2003, 2005, 2007).  
In the proposed model the World System is assumed to be divided into 
three main geographical zones: (1) small (1 mln km2) and highly productive 
zone; (2) a larger size zone with average producing capacity (24 mln km2) 
which surrounds Zone 1; and (3) the largest in size (96 mln km2) and the least 
productive zone surrounding Zone 2 (see Fig. 3). 
     
     
     
     
     
3   2 1   
     
     
     
     
     
Fig. 3. Spatial structure of the World System assumed in the model 
It can be assumed that the first cities originated in Zone 1 (see, e.g., Korotayev 
and Grinin 2006, 2012, 2013; Grinin and Korotayev 2009a, 2009b) which there-
fore, can be identified as the ‘civilizational center’. It is assumed that the ini- 
tial level of technological development in this center (Tc0) is significantly higher 
than that for the barbarian periphery (Tb0) coinciding with Zone 2 at the start of 
computer simulation. At this point, Zone 3 with the lowest initial level of techno-
logical development (Th0) is considered as the World System's hinterland.  
At the first stage of computer simulation the model's major scenario de-
scribes the initial vigorous territorial expansion of the civilizational center sup-
ported by its more developed technologies, which in combination with signifi-
                                                          
9 However, the possible general reasons of the barbarian periphery pressure on civilizational center 
are quite clear: the demographic pressure, the shortage of resources (land, pastures) correlated 
with this and other (natural in the first turn) factors; aspiration to the spoils of war; and pressure 
of enemies (i.e., conflicts within the barbarian periphery) and other similar factors. 
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cantly denser population of the civilization zone results in a significantly higher 
military potential. In the proposed model, the civilization's territorial dynamics 
is mathematically described by means of the following differential equation: 
)( bcc MMadt
dA  , (Eq. 1)
where Ac is the territory controlled by the civilizational core; Mc is the military 
potential of the civilizational core; Mb is the military potential of the barbarian 
periphery; a is the constant which determines the rate of transformation of mili-
tary superiority into territorial acquisitions (the calculation pattern for Mc and 
Mb values will be described below, see Eqs 2 and 3).10 
However, after a while this expansion is exhausted in the major scenario 
of the model and the barbarian periphery's counterattack unfolds.11 Note that in 
the suggested model (as well as in historical reality) less numerous and techno-
logically backward barbarians can put pressure on more numerous and tech- 
nologically advanced ‘civilized’ enemies. This effect may be produced by the 
following factors: 
1) A higher military participation ratio that was characteristic of the barbar-
ians. It is proved by written, ethnographic and even archaeological sources. For 
example, in some territories occupied by the German tribes before the Great 
Migration epoch about 80 % of males were buried with iron weapons (see 
Gurevich 1999: 44). One should also mention the early military training for 
boys among many barbarian (especially nomadic) peoples, for example, among 
Huns, Mongols or Turks when they were nomads (see, e.g., Nefedov 200812).  
                                                          
10 In real history, it could be just the result of demographic pressure of migrants who would absorb 
numerically insignificant aboriginals, or the result of combination of demographic dissipation and 
military superiority. Thus, many barbarians just disappeared as ethno-social entities and were as-
similated by civilized peoples. But those who survived became ethnicities of a new generation 
capable of both military and cultural opposition, and development of their own complex political 
systems which led to creation of analogues of the state among barbarians (see, e.g., Grinin 2001–
2006, 2003b, 2004b, 2007a).  
11 In real history it was most often observed that civilization reached the limits of the natural zones, 
suitable for its economic pattern (and apparently, it would be worth taking into account this ef-
fect in future mathematical models). Note, also, that ‘barbarous counterattack’ in reality might 
start both after the period of established power balance, and sometimes at once without interme-
diate period of balance. Khan Konchak's campaign against the Russians in 1185 following Duke 
Igor Novgorod-Seversky's unsuccessful campaign on the Cumans can serve a classic example 
here. Moreover, the Cuman troops moved toward Rus' in three directions: toward deserted Igor 
and Vsevolod's principalities, toward Pereyaslavl and Kiev, ‘where Konchak was attracted by the 
memories of Khan Bonyak knocking with sabre on Kiev's Golden Gate’ (Rybakov 1966b: 595).  
12 ‘Training of the Turkish archers does not appear to have been inferior to Mongolian archers, and 
similar to the Mongols, constant trainings also promoted the development of muscles of arms. 
‘From eight, or even seven years old they began to shoot at a target, – the imperial ambassador 
Ghiselin de Bousbecq wrote, – and for ten or twelve years they would practice in archery. This 
continuous training strengthened muscles of their arms and gave them such a skill that they could 
hit the smallest targets with their arrows’ (Nefedov 2008).  
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The most important role of this factor in explaining the cases of successful 
advance of the barbarian periphery on civilizational center was described in 
the 16th century by the Ethiopian monk Bahrey in his well-known History of the 
Galla. Bahrey tried to explain why the politically centralized Ethiopian state 
was constantly defeated by the politically less centralized and less developed 
Galla (Oromo) tribes (‘How is it that the Galla defeat us though we are nume- 
rous and well supplied with arms?’ Bahrey 1976 [1593]: 140). The answer 
which Bahrey proposed is very interesting and convincing: just because 
the Ethiopian society was much more developed and socially differentiated 
(i.e., actually more ‘civilized’), it suffered continuous defeats in the fight 
against less developed ‘barbarians’, the Galla. In this case the high level of in-
ternal differentiation (‘civilization’) becomes a source of military weakness:  
How is it that the Galla defeat us, though we are numerous and well sup-
plied with arms?.. It is because our nation is divided into ten classes, 
nine of which take no part whatever in war, and make no shame of dis-
playing their fear; only the tenth class makes war and fights to the best 
of its ability. Now, although we are numerous, those who can fight in 
war are few in number, and there are many who do not go to war. Of 
these classes, the first is that of the monks, of whom there are vast num-
bers. Among them are those who become monks at an early age, drawn 
thereto by the other monks while they are studying, as indeed was the 
case with him who has written this history, and others like him. There 
are also others who become monks because they fear war. A second 
group is composed of those who are called dabtara, or clerks; they study 
the holy books and all works relating to the occupations of the clergy; 
they clap their hands and stamp their feet during divine service, and have 
no shame for their fear of going to the wars. These people take as their 
models the levites and priests, namely, the sons of Aaron. The third 
group is that of the people called Jan Hasana and Jan Maasare, who 
look after the administration of justice, and keep themselves from war. 
The fourth group is formed by those who escort the wives of dignitaries 
and the princesses; they are vigorous, brave, and strong men who never-
theless do not go to war, for they say, ‘We are the protectors of 
the women’. The fifth group calls itself ema gelle, ‘elders’; they are the 
lords and hereditary landowners: they share their land with their labo- 
rers, and are not ashamed of their fear. The sixth group is that of the la-
borers in agriculture, who live in the fields and have no thought of taking 
part in war. The seventh group is composed of those who engage in trade 
and gain profit thereby. The eighth group is that of the artisans, such as 
the smiths, scribes, carpenters, and such-like, who know not the art of 
war. The ninth group is that of the wandering singers, those who play the 
qanda kabaro [a small drum] and the bagana, whose profession is to 
beg, to collect money. They invoke blessings on those who reward them, 
flattering them with vain praises and idle panegyrics; while those who 
refuse to give them presents they curse, though they are not blamewor-
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thy for this, for, as they say, ‘This is our custom’. Such people keep 
themselves as far as possible from war. The tenth group, finally, is com-
posed of those who carry the shield and spear, who can fight, and who 
follow the steps of their king to war. It is because these are so few in 
number that our country is ruined. Among the Galla, on the contrary, 
these nine classes which we have mentioned do not exist; all men, from 
small to great, are instructed in warfare, and for this reason they ruin and 
kill us (Bahrey 1976 [1593]: 140–141).13 
In our model the higher coefficient of military participation that was typi-
cal for barbarians is mathematically described in Eq. 3 by giving b coefficient 
(representing the military participation ratio of barbarians here, i.e., the per-
centage of barbarian population participating in military operations) significant-
ly higher value than that of c coefficient (representing the military participation 
ratio for the ‘civilized’ population) in Eq. 2. For example, in the computer si- 
                                                          
13 However, it is worth noticing that military forces of small polities were quite often comparable 
with military forces of large ones in those political entities of civilizations where the level of mil-
itary participation of inhabitants was high (e.g., in some civil communities, in particular in Greek 
poleis, Roman civitas, some medieval cities). The best known example is Greek-Persian wars 
when an alliance of civil communities with a high military participation ratio defeated a low mil-
itary participation ratio empire. Note also that the suggested mathematical model does not con-
sider the following factors of barbarians' military superiority (which it would be worth consider-
ing in future generations of similar mathematical models): a) a high mobility of some barbarian 
peoples in comparison with settled farmers which is quite often defined by their own way of life, 
as well as a low specific useful biomass output per unit of economically exploited territory (that 
causes the need of moving in order to increase their zone of economic exploitation). Especially it 
refers to nomads and the sea peoples, as well as the inhabitants of those places where rivers con-
stituted the main communication lines. From the very beginning water transport was the main 
means of long distance connections (McNeill 1995). Therefore we suggested an idea that it is 
necessary to multiply the number of inhabitants among herders and seamen by the coefficient of 
their mobility for considering their potential for the intensification of political complexity growth 
processes (Korotayev 1991; Grinin 2007a). Such mobility often secures possibilities of the rapid 
advance in huge territories where civilizations are located; b) Higher prestige (concerning the 
whole population) of military activities. In other words, in a number of civilizations military pro-
fessionals had no such prestige as priests or officials. For example, the founders of the Song 
Dynasty in China (960–1279) significantly downgraded and changed the position of military 
elite in order to prevent the possibility of the ‘military coups’ that undermined the stability of the 
political system of their predecessors (Wright 2001). But even where military estate stood high 
(as, e.g., in medieval Europe or Japan), monopolization of military affairs in their hands led to 
the fact that most of population were specialized in peaceful occupations and as a result their 
military potential was close to zero. So, for example, in the 8th and 9th centuries in Charlemagne's 
empire, especially in France, the hardships that came along with military service actively in-
duced peasants to pass voluntarily under the protection of large secular and religious landowners, 
thereby even by sacrificing their civil freedom (see, e.g., Gurevich 1970: 145–183). In Russia, it 
was not uncommon when voluntary transfer of noble children to serf status took place in order to 
save them from military service. At the same time participation in military affairs was very hon-
orable among barbarians (especially in state analogues), and very often volunteers' participation 
was sufficient to support major military actions in such affairs (see, e.g., Fenton 1978: 127 on the 
Iroquois).  
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mulations whose results are given below for the main scenario of our model, 
the value of с is 0.05, whereas the value of b coefficient is 0.2. 
cccc HTcNM  , (Eq. 2)
where Nc is the size of ‘civilized’ population; Tc is the level of technological 
development of the civilizational core (for simplicity it is assumed that the level 
of development of military technologies of civilization is proportional to the 
general level of its technological development; therefore, within this model it is 
not identified as a separate variable); Hc is the level of asabiyyah of civilized 
population (we will dwell upon this variable below); 
bmbbb HTbNM  , (Eq. 3)
where Nb is the number of inhabitants of the barbarian periphery; Tmb is the 
level of development of military technologies in the barbarian periphery (it is 
assumed that this variable is not identical with the general level of technolog-
ical development of the barbarian periphery; the implications of this assump-
tion will be considered below); and Hb is the level of barbarians' asabiyyah. 
2) Borrowing of military technologies by barbarians happened at higher ra- 
tes, than borrowing of non-military technologies (the chosen by us way to mo- 
del this assumption mathematically will be described below). For example, due 
to the fact that Mongols borrowed siege equipment and technology from China, 
they were able to take a lot of cities successfully. Thus, in this case borrowing 
of military innovations was one of important reasons of mass destruction of 
cities of the World System in the 13th century. Nevertheless, the abovemen-
tioned facts about borrowings refer not only to weapons, but also to the strate-
gy, tactics, and organization of the army. Quite often barbarians just imitated 
the structure of armies (or separate military institutes) of the neighboring civili-
zations. For example, the German leader Marobod (the late 1st century BCE – 
the early 1st century CE), having united Marcomanni with the Lugians, the Mu-
gilones, Ghots and other Germanic tribes, created a large army on the Roman 
pattern which numbered 70,000 of infantry and 4,000 of cavalry (SIE 1966: 
123).14 
                                                          
14 By the way, such borrowings became the main impulse for transformation of the non-state sys-
tems into the early state society quite often. This happened, e.g., as a result of the borrowing of 
iron weapons, and later fire arms (in particular, one could see examples of the latter in Madagas-
car in the 17th century [Deshan 1984: 353; Ratzel 1902, vol. 1: 445], or in Tahiti and Hawaii in 
the 18th century [Service 1975; Earle 2002: 86; for more details about similar cases see Grinin 
2007a]). Note some more points here which are not considered in the present version of our 
model, but which it would be worth considering in the next generation of the models of interac-
tion between the civilizational center and barbarian periphery. A) Barbarians themselves could 
be inventors of important military innovations. It is fair enough since many people considered 
war as the most important issue and became professionals of military attacks and robberies. 
Sometimes such inventions helped some barbarian chiefdoms to defeat others. A classic example 
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3) The beginning of forceful expansion of the civilizational core upon the 
barbarian periphery can be interpreted as the formation of a metaethnic border 
between the civilization and the barbarian world. As was clearly demonstrated 
by Peter V. Turchin (2003, 2005, 2007), the formation of such a metaethnic 
border tends to lead to a significant increase in collective solidarity (asabiyyah) 
in that party that turned out to be under pressure.15 As a result, if at the begin-
ning of its forceful expansion civilization faced scattered groups of barbarians 
incapable to produce any effective resistance, further on these groups began to 
cooperate more and more among themselves for putting up resistance, and civi-
lization had to deal with more and more united and large coalitions of barbari-
ans (which were formed in many respects as a reaction to forceful expansion 
and were able to show more and more effective resistance, and further to start 
                                                                                                                                
was that Shaka, the leader of the Zulu people, who applied a new type of cold weapon that in 
many respects promoted progress of his army and formation of the empire (Ritter 1968; Ratzel 
1902, 2: 116). As a result, the Zulu polity was transformed from the pre-state level to the one of 
the state. There were cases when such inventions promoted expansion of barbarians against civi-
lization. East Germans in the 5th century CE probably invented some kind of huge backsword 
with the straight sharpened blade (scramasax) which was up to 80 cm long. It was a typical saber 
weapon capable of giving terrible wounds which increased the power of a horse soldier. Therefore, 
it was borrowed by Huns, and then Goths and Francs (Kardini 1987: 263–264). The striking ex-
ample of such innovations of barbarians were ships and naval tactics of Vikings who ‘were se- 
cond to none at sea’ and whose sea advantage was often absolute (Gurevich 2005: 41 and ff.). 
One can also mention, e.g., military tactical and organization innovations used in Genghis Khan's 
army, which undoubtedly played a great role in the Mongol victories. Thus, if barbarians and 
civilization were incomparable by cultural level, they could be quite comparable as regards their 
military-strategic levels, and quite often barbarians also had superiority, but at the same time 
kept such forms of organization of society which, according to to the well-known expert of no-
madic studies William Irons, were real alternatives to state organization (Irons 2002, 2004) and 
could reproduce themselves without cities (though they could control cities populated by con-
quered peoples). B) In the process of weakening collective solidarity (~ asabiyyah) of civiliza-
tions and states, conflicting parts of civilization begin to use barbarians as allies, which gives 
them a chance to interfere with affairs of the civilization core. One can recollect that the author 
of The Song of Igor's Campaign wrote that dukes began ‘to forge feuds for themselves’, and ‘to 
draw the pagans onto the Russian land’. The late Roman and Byzantine history gives a lot of ex-
amples of the ‘integration’ of barbarians into policy of civilization. A classic example is a trage-
dy of post-Roman Britain. After the withdrawal of the Roman troops from Britain in 410 CE, the 
Britons (Romanized British Celts) searching for the defenders from attacks of the Irish and Scot-
tish barbarians invited the Saxones and gave them some land (thereby having exercised a certain 
social innovation, which was, however, repeatedly used in the Roman world with its practice of 
‘fighting against barbarians with barbarians' hands’). But having seen weakness of the Britons, 
the Saxones ceased to obey the local authorities and together with the Angles and the Jutes be-
came eventually the owners of the country. And, despite their prolong and persistent resistance, 
the Britons were partly expelled, partly enslaved, and partly destroyed. Therefore, Anglo-Saxon 
barbarous kingdoms emerged in Britain in place of the ‘Briton’ state (e.g., Blair 1966: 149–168; 
Chadwick 1987: 71). Thus, military opportunities of barbarians could significantly increase with 
their involvement into military-political affairs of civilization.  
15 Those, who withstood it, found adequate responses to the challenge that finally led to the selec-
tion of types of barbarian communities most adapted to the fighting against civilization.  
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successful counterattacks). As has already been mentioned above, Turchin sug-
gests using for denoting ‘collective solidarity’ the term asabiyyah that was in-
troduced into the scientific discourse by Abd ar-Rahman Ibn Khaldun16 (1332–
1406). 
In the model, the dynamics of barbarian asabiyyah (Hb) is described math-
ematically by means of the following equation: 
dt
dAe
dt
dH cb  , (Eq. 4)
where e is a constant. It means that the higher the rates of forceful territorial 
expansion of civilization, the higher the growth rates of barbarians' asabiyyah.17 
Respectively: 
,
dt
dAe
dt
dH cc   (Eq. 5) 
where Hc is asabiyyah of civilized population.  
Note that it means that asabiyya of civilization begins to grow under the 
pressure of barbarians, and the stronger this pressure is, the quicker it grows 
(for more details see Turchin 2005).  
While describing population dynamics, we base ourselves upon the simpli-
fied version of the compact model of demographic, technological and economic 
development of the World System (Kremer 1993; Korotayev 2005, 2006d, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2012, 2013; Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a, 2006b, 
2007; Korotayev and Malkov 2012; Zinkina, Malkov, and Korotayev 2014; 
Korotayev and Malkov 2016; Korotayev and Zinkina 2017; Grinin 2003a, 
2012; Grinin L. and Grinin A. 2015, 2016; Grinin A. and Grinin L. 2015; Grin-
in and Korotayev 2016; Grinin L., Grinin A., and Korotayev 2017a). We make 
a Malthusian assumption that throughout the most part of the period of exist-
ence of the humankind, the human population was limited by the level of de-
velopment of life-supporting technologies. As in simplified Kremer's model 
(Kremer 1993: 685), we assume that population comes to technologically de-
termined level of the Earth's carrying capacity instantly (or, in other words, 
instantly fills the ecological niche expanded as a result of technological 
growth).18 Besides, we take into account the fact that territory with a higher 
                                                          
16 See, e.g., Ibn Khaldun 1958, 2004; Batsieva 1965; Ignatenko 1980; Alekseev and Khaltourina 
2004; Turchin 2003, 2007; Korotayev and Khaltourina 2006; Korotayev 2006e, 2007d; Inan 
1933; Mahdi 1937.  
17 We also assume that with the increase in barbarians' asabiyyah the rate of borrowing of military 
technologies of civilization increases (this assumption is modeled by the Eq. (8’’’’). We also as-
sume that variable H cannot have negative values.  
18 Let us note that it deprives us of an opportunity to describe cyclical dynamics of the system in the 
basin of attraction (see, e.g., Korotayev, Komarova, and Khaltourina 2007) that would bring dy-
namics generated by the model considerably closer to actually observable one, but at the same 
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natural productivity can support the existence of a larger population at the same 
level of technological development, than the territory with smaller natural pro-
ducing capacity, and otherwise under equal conditions a larger territory can 
support a larger population than a smaller territory. Thus, the size of population 
(N) of some zone with productivity F and area A at the level of development 
of life-supporting technologies T will be described mathematically by means of 
the following equation: 
N = gFTA, (Eq. 6)
where g is a constant.  
As a result, the mathematical description of the population for year i for 
a hinterland of the World System (Zone 3) appears to be the simplest one in our 
model, since we have initially assumed that the territory occupied by it 
throughout the modeled period remains constant, and the level of technological 
development is the same for the whole zone: 
N3i = gF3T3iA3. (Eq. 7)
The situation with the civilizational core and barbarian periphery of the 
World System is a little more complicated. The matter is that throughout 
the most part of the modeled period the civilization zone is divided into two 
subzones with different natural productivity, i.e. the core of the civilization 
zone with high natural productivity (~ Zone 1) and the periphery of the zone 
corresponding to the part of less productive Zone 2 taken by the civilization 
from ‘barbarians’. Thus, 
Nci = N1ci + N2ci,  (Eq. 8)
where Nci is population of the civilization core for year i; N1ci is the ‘civilized’ 
population of Zone 1 for year i; N2ci is the ‘civilized’ population of Zone 2 for 
year i.  
At the same time: 
N1ci = gF1TciA1ci,  (Eq. 9)
where A1ci is the area of the part of Zone 1 controlled by civilization for year i; 
N2ci = gF2TciA2ci,  (Eq. 10)
where A1ci is the area of the part of Zone 2 controlled by civilization for year i. 
Respectively, 
Nbi = N2bi + N1bi,  (Eq. 11)
where Nbi is population of the barbarian periphery for year i; N2bi is the ‘barbar-
ian’ population of Zone 2 for year i; N1bi is the ‘barbarian’ population of Zone 1 
for year i.  
                                                                                                                                
time this considerably simplifies the suggested model, which made us dwell on this simplified 
version of description of dependence of population on the level of technological development.  
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Herewith, 
N2bi = gF2TbiA2bi,  (Eq. 12)
where A2bi is the area of the part of Zone 2 controlled by ‘barbarians’ for year i; 
N1bi = gF2TbiA2bi,  (Eq. 13)
where A1bi is the area of the part of Zone 1 controlled by ‘barbarians’ for year i. 
The way of calculation of A1c, A2c, A2b and A1b variables employed by us in this 
model is described below (see Table 1 and Eqs 9, 10, 24, 25).  
The total population of the World System for year i (Nwi) is calculated by 
means of the following equation: 
Nwi = Nсi + Nbi + N3i. (Eq. 14)
Similarly to our general model of the World System development, mathemati-
cal description of technological dynamics is based upon the equation for tech-
nological growth proposed by Michael Kremer19 (Kremer 1993: 686): 
,hNT
dt
dT   (Eq. 15) 
where h is a constant (~ coefficient of technological innovative activity of po- 
pulation).  
We assume that the diffusion of innovations proceeds from the civilization 
center of the World System to its barbarian periphery and from it to hinter-
land (1). Though in reality the diffusion of innovations from hinterland to pe-
riphery (2), from periphery – to center (3), as well as between various subzones 
of periphery (4) and hinterland (5) was also observed, after all the main flow of 
technological diffusion went in the first of the abovementioned directions (see, 
e.g., Chubarov 1991; Grinin A. and Grinin L. 2015, 2016) and we decided to 
refrain from the modeling of diffusion of technological innovations in other 
directions for the sake of simplicity of our model.  
Thus, the following system of difference equations has been used in our 
model to model the technological development of the World System: 
Tci = Tci-1 +hNci-1Tci-1, (Eq. 16)
where Tci is the level of technological development of the civilization core of 
the World System for year i;  
Tbi = Tbi-1 +hN’bi-1Tbi-1 + k(Tc – Tb), (Eq. 17)
where Tbi is the level of technological development of the barbarian periphery 
for year i; N’b – population of the barbarian Zone; k – a constant;  
T3i = T3i-1 +hN’3i-1T3i-1 + l(Tbi-1 – T3i-1), (Eq. 18)
                                                          
19 Note that quite independently from Michael Kremer this equation was proposed by Rein Taa-
gepera (1976, 1979), A. V. Podlazov (2000, 2001, 2002) and S. V. Tsirel (2004).  
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where T3i is the level of technological development of hinterland (Zone 3) for 
year i; N’3 is population of hinterland; l is a constant.  
As has already been mentioned above, we introduce an additional equation 
for description of dynamics of development of ‘barbarians'’ military technolo-
gies to take into account the effect of the more rapid borrowing by ‘barbarians'’ 
of military technologies in comparison with peaceful technologies: 
Tmbi = Tmbi-1 +mN’bi-1Tmbi-1 + nHbi-1(Tci-1 – Tmbi-1), (Eq. 19)
where m and n are constants.  
The effect that is of the most interest for us can be described by means of 
Eqs 17 and 19 by giving a higher value to n coefficient in Eq. 19 in comparison 
with the value of k coefficient in Eq. 17. This equation also describes an as-
sumption that the rates of barbarians' borrowings of military technologies grow 
along with the growth of their asabiyyahs.  
We assume that all the urban population of the World System is concen-
trated in its civilizational core. For mathematical description of urbanization 
dynamics in the model the following equation is used: 
uci = pTci, (Eq. 20)
where uci is the index of urbanization of the civilizational core (a share of urban 
population in the total population of civilization core), and p is a constant. The 
possibility of approximation of uci ~ pT follows from the equations of our com-
pact model of the general World System development (Korotayev, Malkov, and 
Khaltourina 2007; Korotayev, Komarova, and Khaltourina 2007; Korotayev 
2012, 2013). At the same time an empirical testing of this approximation was 
not carried out, and this testing was done by us. We use the World System 
Technological Development Index proposed by us earlier (Korotayev 2006a) 
for an empirical test of this hypothesis. Let us recollect that this index was cal-
culated on the basis of Hellemans – Bunch database (Hellemans and Bunch 
1988). In this database Hellemans and Bunch tried to record in chronological 
sequence all the main inventions and discoveries that had been made by the 
1980s. As a value of the World System Technological Development Index for 
the moment X we use the total number of inventions and discoveries which 
were made in the World System up to that moment. 
The correlation between this World System Technological Development 
Index and the World System Urbanization Index calculated by us earlier (Koro-
tayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2007: 122–127; Korotayev 2007; Grinin and 
Korotayev 2008: Ch. 4) looks as follows (see Fig. 4): 
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Fig. 4. Correlation between the World System Technological Deve- 
lopment Index (T) and the World System Urbanization In- 
dex (u) (3500 BCE – 1970 CE): scatterplot with a fitted re-
gression line 
Note: R = 0.95; R2 = 0.903; p = 1.08 · 10-15. 
Thus, we find a rather strong and statistically significant correlation between 
these indices.  
The total number of urban population in the model is defined by the fol-
lowing equation: 
U = ucNc. (Eq. 21)
Finally, the World System Urbanization Index (a share of urban population in a 
total number of the World System population) uw is defined by the following 
equation: 
w
w N
Uu  , (Eq. 22)
where Nw is the total population of the World System.20  
                                                          
20 Thus, the World System urbanization appears here in our model as a purely dependent variable. 
Perhaps, it would make sense to consider its influence on some other key variable models (e.g., 
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Table 1 gives a summary description of the model: 
Table 1. Compact mathematical model of influence of interaction of 
the civilizational center and barbarian periphery on the de-
velopment of the World System (a detailed description) 
Variable 
symbol Meaning = Value for year i 
Equation 
number 
A1 The territory of Zone 1 = 
Constant, in computer simulations the 
results of which are given below, has 
the value of 1 mln km2 
– 
A2 The territory of Zone 2 = Constant, 24 mln km2 – 
A3 The territory of Zone 3 = Constant, 96 mln km2 – 
F1 
‘Index of natural ferti-
lity’ of Zone 1 = 
Constant, in computer simulations, 
the results of which are given below 
has the value 10  
– 
F2 
‘Index of natural ferti-
lity’ of Zone 2 = Constant, 3  – 
F3 
‘Index of natural ferti-
lity’ of Zone 3 = Constant, 1  – 
Ac 
The territory of ‘civili-
zation zone’  = 
Aci-1 + a(Mci-1 – Mbi-1); 
Ac0 = A1 = 1 mln km2. This variable 
cannot have negative values  
(1) 
Ab 
The territory of the 
‘barbarian periphery’ = 
Abi-1 + a(Mbi-1 – Mci-1); 
Ab0 = A2 = 24 mln km2. This variable 
cannot have negative values either 
(23) 
A1c 
The territory of the part 
of Zone 1, controlled 
by civilization 
= 
It is described by a version of Eq. 1; 
A1c0 = Ac0 = A1 = 1 mln km2; it does 
not change while there is an expan-
sion of civilization; if as a result of 
counterattack of barbarians they com-
pletely return Zone 2 to themselves, 
then A1ci = A1ci-1 + a(Mci-1 – Mbi-1) till 
A1c (= Ac) reaches zero value (it is 
interpreted as a complete conquest of 
civilization by barbarians) or returns 
to value of 1 mln km2 (it is interpreted 
(9) 
                                                                                                                                
on the rates of technological growth which was already made by M. Artzrouni and J. Komlos 
[Artzrouni and Komlos 1985] and that, in our opinion, might allow us to give a more exact de-
scription of technological dynamics of the World System in the basins of attraction of attractors 
B1 and В2), but in order to avoid excessive complication of the model we opt to refrain from this, 
though the action of this factor may be taken into account in future models. 
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Variable 
symbol Meaning = Value for year i 
Equation 
number 
as a full expulsion of barbarians from 
Zone 1).21 This variable cannot have 
negative values  
A2c 
The territory of the part 
of Zone 2 controlled by 
civilization 
= Ac – A1 if Ac > A1; 0 if Ac  A1. (10) 
A2b 
The territory of the part 
of Zone 2, controlled 
by ‘barbarians’ 
= Ab if Ab  A2; A2 (= in our case 24) if Ab > A2 (24) 
A1b 
The territory of the part 
of Zone 1, controlled 
by ‘barbarians’ 
= 0 if Ab  A2; A1 – Ac if Ab > A2. (25) 
Mc 
Military potential of 
civilization  = cNcTcHc (2) 
Mb 
Military potential of 
the ‘barbarians’   = 
bNbTcHc . It is assumed that the value 
of the military participation ratio of 
‘barbarians’ (b) is significantly higher 
than that for ‘civilized’ population. In 
computer simulations whose results 
are presented below, the value of c is 
assumed to be equal to 0.05, and the 
value of coefficient b is assumed to be 
equal to 0.2 
(3) 
Hb 
Index of barbarians' 
collective solidarity 
(asabiyyah)  
= Hbi-1 + e(Aci – Aci-1); Hbi  0  (4) 
Hc 
Index of collective 
solidarity (asabiyyah) 
of ‘civilized’ popula-
tion 
= Hci-1 – e(Aci – Aci-1); Hci  0  (5) 
Nc 
Population of the civi-
lizational core  = N1ci + N2ci (8) 
N1c 
‘Сivilized’ population 
of Zone 1 = gF1TciA1ci (26) 
N2c 
‘Сivilized’ population 
of Zone 2 = gF2TciA2ci (27) 
Nb 
Population of the bar-
barian periphery  = N2b + N1b (11) 
N2b 
‘Barbarian’ population 
of Zone 2 = gF2TbiA1bi (28) 
                                                          
21 It is obvious that the easiest way to model the dynamics of this variable is to give it the value of A1 
(that is 1 in our computer simulations) when Ac  A1 and value Ac when Ac < A1. This method was 
also applied by us in real computer simulations for this and other similar variables (A2c, A2b и A1b). 
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Variable 
symbol Meaning = Value for year i 
Equation 
number 
N1b 
‘Barbarian’ population 
of Zone 2 = gF1TbiA1bi (29) 
N3 Population of Zone 3 = gF3T3iA3 (7) 
Nw 
Total population 
of the World System = Nсi + Nbi + N3i (14) 
Tc 
Level of technological 
development of the 
World System civiliza-
tional core 
= Tci-1 +hNci-1Tci-1 (16) 
Tb 
The level of technolo-
gical development of 
the barbarian periphery 
= Tbi-1 +hN’bi-1Tbi-1 + k(Tc – Tb) (17) 
N’b 
Population in one sub-
zone of ‘Barbarian 
Zone’ (with condition-
nal area of each sub-
zone being equal to 
1 mln km2) 
= 
Nbi/Abi (note that the area of zones in 
our model is measured in mln km2 
therefore this division gives the popu-
lation of ‘barbarians’ per 1 mln km2)  
– 
T3 
The level of technolo-
gical development 
of the World System 
hinterland (= Zone 3) 
= T3i-1 +hN’3i-1T3i-1 + l(Tbi-1 – T3i-1) (18) 
N’3 
Population in one sub-
zone of Zone 3 (with 
conditional area of 
each subzone being 
equal to 1 mln km2) 
= N3/A3 – 
Tmb 
The level of develop-
ment of military tech-
nologies of ‘barbarians’
= Tmbi-1 +mN’bi-1Tmbi-1 + nHbi-1(Tci-1 – – Tmbi-1)  
(19) 
uc 
Index of urbanization of 
the civilizational core 
(a share of urban popu-
lation in the total po- 
pulation of the civiliza-
tional core) 
= pTc; 0  uc  0.9 (9) 
U Total urban population = ucNc (21) 
uw 
Index of the World 
System urbanization 
(a share of urban popu-
lation in the total po- 
pulation of the World 
System) 
= U / Nw (22) 
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A typical dynamics generated by the model with average values of parame-
ters and initial conditions is presented in Figs 5–7: 
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Fig. 5. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilizational 
core generated by the main scenario of the model (mln km2) 
0.01
0.1
1
10
-3000 -2500 -2000 -1500 -1000 -500 0 500
 
Fig. 6. Dynamics of the World System urban population (millions) gene- 
rated by the model, logarithmic scale 
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Fig. 7. Dynamics of the World System urbanization index (proportion 
of urban population in the total population of the World Sys-
tem) generated by the model, logarithmic scale 
Note. Figs 5–7 show results of computer simulation with the following values of 
parameters and initial conditions: t0 = 3000 BCE = –3000; A1 = 1 mln km2; A2 = 
= 24 mln km2; A3 = 96 mln km2; F1 = 10; F2 = 3; F3 = 1; Ac0 = 1 mln km2; A1c0 = 
= 1 mln km2; A2c0 = 0; Ab0 = 24 mln km2; A2b0 = 24 mln km2; A1b0 = 0; Tc0 = 10; 
Tb0 = 2; Tmb0 = 3; T3_0 = 0.2; Hc0 = 1; Hb0 = 0.1; a = 0.012; b = 0.2; c = 0.05; e = 0.052; 
g = 0.05; h = m = 0.0000315; k = l = 0.000504; n = 0.00504; p = 0.00125.  
Within this computer simulation one can distinguish the following phases:  
Phase 1 (years 0–130 of the computer simulation). Vigorous accelerating 
expansion of civilization.  
Accelerating expansion of civilization in this phase is generated by the fol-
lowing system of positive feedbacks (see Fig. 8):  
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  Increase in popula-
tion controlled by 
civilization (Nc) 
  
+ 
  +  +
Growth of the 
territory of 
civilization (Ac) 
+ 

Growth 
of military potential
of civilization (Mc) 
+ 

Growth 
of technological 
potential of 
civilization (Tc) 
+   +
Reduction 
of the territory 
of the barbarian 
periphery (Ab) 
 
 
 
 
+ 
Slowdown 
of the growth of 
‘barbarians'’military
potential (Mb) 
+ 
Reduction of 
population size 
of the barbarian 
periphery (Nb) 
    
Fig. 8. System of positive feedbacks generating the accelerating terri-
torial expansion of civilization during the first phase of the 
computer simulation 
Thus, at this phase the growth of the civilization territory leads to the increase 
in its population, which results in increase in its military potential both directly 
(the size of the army [i.e. the number of soldiers] increases along with the in-
crease in population size), and through acceleration of technological growth 
rates (allowing to supply the soldiers with more effective weapons); the incre- 
ase in military potential of civilization leads to further increase in its territory 
which results in further acceleration of growth of its population, etc.; on the 
other hand, acceleration of the growth of the territory of civilization leads 
to a substantial reduction of the territory of barbarian periphery and con- 
sequently, decrease of population size and military potential of ‘barbarians’ that 
promotes further acceleration of growth of the territory of civilization, reduc-
tion of the territory of the barbarian periphery, etc. 
Andrey V. Korotayev and Leonid E. Grinin 169 
At this phase one can observe the accelerated growth of population of the 
World System22, the World System urbanization index23 and the urban popula-
tion.24  
Phase 2 (years 130–340 of the simulation). Slowdown of expansion of civi-
lization.  
The following system of negative feedbacks comes to the foreground dur-
ing this phase: the growth of the civilization territory leads to the growth of 
asabiyyah of ‘barbarians’, which is expressed in increase in the level of their po- 
litical culture and organization25, and leads to the growth of their military 
potential both directly and through the acceleration of rates of borrowing 
of military technologies of civilization (including military and organizational 
and tactical innovations) which results in reduction of rates of growth of the 
civilization territory which, until it slows down to zero level, continues to lead 
(through the mechanisms mentioned above) to the growth of barbarians' mili-
tary potential and further slowdown of rates of territorial expansion of civiliza-
tion (see Fig. 9). 
 + 
Growth of 
asabiyyah 
of ‘barbarians’ (Hb) 
  
  +  + 
Growth 
of the territo-
ry of civili-
zation (Ac) 
– 
 
Growth 
of barbarian 
periphery's military 
capacity (Mb) 
+ 
 
Growth of rates 
of military 
technologies' 
borrowing (Tmb) 
     
 
Fig. 9. System of negative feedbacks generating slow-down of the 
territorial expansion of civilization at the second phase of 
computer simulation 
                                                          
22 First of all as a result of increasing diffusion of high technologies of civilization in the territo-
ries of Zone 2 subordinated by it, the growth of the carrying capacity there, and, therefore, 
the population.  
23 In connection both with accelerating technological growth of civilization and with the growth 
of ‘civilized’ population percentage in the total World System population.  
24 In connection both with the growth of urbanization in civilizational zone, and with the accelerated 
growth of its population as a result of the territorial expansion. 
25 In historical reality we find the corresponding situation: as A. M. Khazanov notes, though no-
mads may seem barbarians for settled contemporaries , these ‘barbarians’ may be quite sophisti-
cated in a political sense (Khazanov 2002: 54).  
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Nevertheless, at this phase the expansion of civilization proceeds at rather rapid 
(though more and more slowing down) rates; besides, a rather rapid (though 
slowing down) growth of population of the World System also continues. 
However, since year 154 of our computer simulation the absolute growth rates 
of population of the World System begin to decrease, but up to the end of Pha- 
se 2 they remain rather high. Since year 209 of the computer simulation the 
absolute growth rates of urban population also begin to decrease (remaining 
nevertheless rather high). During this phase, the growth rates of the World Sys-
tem urbanization index decrease almost twice (nevertheless remaining rather 
high if compared with the subsequent two phases). 
Phase 3 (years 340–510 of the simulation). Expansion of civilization is ex-
hausted and stops. Approximate power balance. The barbarian periphery be-
gins its counterattack.  
During this phase, the territory of civilization in comparison to the territory 
of its barbarian periphery changes rather slowly, no more than 0.01 million km2 
per year (reaching at the inflection point, in year 408 of simulation, 48 km2 per 
year). At the first stage of this phase the action of the above-mentioned mecha-
nism of negative feedback leads to its logical conclusion – military potentials of 
civilization and barbarian periphery become equal to each other, and the rates 
of expansion of civilization reduce to zero level. However, the process of rather 
fast borrowing of military technologies of civilization by ‘barbarians’ contin-
ues. As a result military potential of the barbarian periphery begins to exceed 
that of civilization, and ‘barbarians’ start their counterattack. At the beginning 
it develops extremely slowly (83 km2 during the first year); but 
the beginning of ‘barbarian counterattack’ leads to the formation of the system 
of positive feedbacks giving more and more noticeable results every year – 
acceleration of the growth of barbarian periphery territory leads to the accelera-
tion of the growth of population of barbarian periphery, which in turn, leads to 
the increase in the military potential of ‘barbarians’ and even greater increase 
in the territory of barbarian periphery and consequently, to a greater increase in 
‘barbarian’ population, etc.; on the other hand, acceleration of growth of the 
territory of barbarian periphery leads to a substantial reduction of the territory 
of civilization and consequently, to the decrease of civilization population, and 
military potential of civilization which promotes further acceleration of the 
growth of the territory of barbarian periphery, reduction of the territory of civi-
lization, etc. (see Fig. 10). 
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+
Acceleration of the growth 
of population of the barbarian 
periphery (Nb) 
  +
Acceleration of the growth 
of territory of the barbarian 
periphery (Ab) 
+ 
 
Acceleration of the growth 
of military potential 
of ‘barbarians’ (Mb) 
+  +
Reduction of territory 
of civilization (Ac) 
 
+ 
Reduction of the rate of growth 
of military potential of 
civilization (Mc) 
+ 
Reduction of the population size 
of the civilizational center (Nc) 
Fig. 10. System of positive feedbacks generating the accelerating 
territorial counter-expansion of the barbarian periphery at 
the 4th and 5th phases of computer simulation 
It is interesting to note that in our computer simulation by the time of the be-
ginning of counterattack of barbarian periphery the total number of ‘barbarians’ 
(7.9 million) is almost three times less than the number of ‘the civilized popula-
tion’ (23.4 million), and the index of their general technological develop- 
ment (3.7) is much lower than the level of technological development of ci- 
vilization (12.1). At the same time the counterattack of barbarians appears 
to be possible due to a higher military participation ratio peculiar to them, and 
also due to the point that at the beginning of counterattack their asabiyyah is 
higher than the civilization asabiyyah, and their military technology is much 
higher (7.15) than the general level of their technological development (3.7).  
The growth rates of the total population of the World System decrease in 
this phase almost three times from moderate 0.125 to 0.043 % per year. At the 
end of this phase there begins the slowdown in rates of technological growth of 
civilization. Urban population growth falls to 260 people per year, and growth 
of the index of urbanization – to 0.0002 % per year. 
Phase 4 (years 510–680 of the simulation). Accelerating expansion of the 
barbarian periphery.  
At this phase the mechanism of the positive feedback accelerating the counter-
attack of the barbarian periphery works at full capacity. The territory controlled 
by the civilizational center is reduced by 2.5 million km2. The population of 
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the civilizational center is reduced from 24.1 to 21.7 million people. This re-
duction is only partially compensated by the increase in population of the bar-
barian periphery and hinterland of the World System; as a result, the growth 
rate of total population of the World System falls from 0.043 to 0.01 % per 
year. The rates of technological growth of civilization are reduced from 0.076 
to 0.068 % per year. Since year 614 of our computer simulation the continuing 
growth of urban population in the territory unoccupied by barbarians ceases 
compensating the reduction of the urban population as a result of counterattack 
of the barbarian periphery, and the total number of urban population begins to 
decrease. Even earlier (since year 577 of the simulation) the World System ur-
banization index begins to decrease. 
Phase 5 (years 680–935 of the simulation). Slowdown of the expansion of 
the barbarian periphery.  
During this phase a system of feedbacks reducing the vigor of counterattack of 
barbarian periphery comes to the foreground.  
Growth 
of asabiyya of 
the civilizational 
center (Hb) 
+ 
 
 
 
Acceleration of the 
growth of military 
potential of the 
civilizational 
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+  
Increase 
in the territory of 
barbarian periphery 
(Ab) =  
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of the territory 
of civilization (Ac) 
– 
 
 
– 
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Slowdown 
of the growth of 
military potential 
of barbarian 
periphery (Mb) 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
Reduction in rates 
of borrowing 
of military 
technologies (Tmb) 
  
 + Reduction 
of asabiyya 
of ‘barbarians’ (Hb)
Fig. 11. The system of negative feedbacks, generating the slowdown 
of territorial expansion of the barbarian periphery during 
Phase 5 of the computer simulation 
Despite its slowdown, the continuing counterattack of the barbarian periphery 
throughout this phase is able to lead to very significant consequences. The area 
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of the territory controlled by the civilizational center is reduced almost twice. 
The population of the civilizational center falls from 21.73 to 15.97 million 
people. Until year 730 of the simulation this reduction is compensated in 
a lesser degree than earlier by the increase of population of the barbarian pe-
riphery and hinterland of the World System; therefore the growth rate in the 
World System total population reduces almost to zero. Later, the effect of 
the slowdown of expansion of the barbarian periphery begins to manifest it-
self, which against the background of continuing acceleration of growth rates 
of population of the barbarian periphery and hinterland leads to the renewal of 
the increase in growth rates of the total population of the World System (though 
it restarts growing very slow, showing the growth, say, only by 0.002 % be-
tween years 730 and 789 of our simulation, and even in 935 population growth 
rates of the World System remain extremely low, i.e., 0.027 % per year, while 
at the beginning of the first phase they were 0.37 % per year, i.e. they were ten 
times higher). Technological growth rates of civilization continue to decrease 
(from 0.068 to 0.05 % per year). The urban population declines from 403,000 
to 344,000 people (at the same time the effect of the decline of the vigor of the 
barbarian counterattack begins to manifest itself – the absolute rates of de-
crease in urban population reach maximum in years 817–838, and then begin 
to decline). The World System urbanization index falls from 0.0116 to 0.0095 
(though reduction rates of this indicator since year 865 of our simulation begin 
to decline too). 
Phase 6 (years 935–2885 of the simulation). Expansion of the barbarian 
periphery reaches its peak. Approximate balance of forces. Civilization launch-
es the counterattack. 
During this phase, the territory of the barbarian periphery as compared to the 
territory of the civilizational core changes rather slowly, no more than 
0.01 million km2 per year (reaching at the inflection point just 0.5 km2 per year 
in year 2047 of our simulation). At the first stage of this phase (years 
935–2047), the action of the negative feedback described in Fig. 10 produces 
its logical conclusion: military potentials of civilization and barbarian periphery 
become equal to each other, and expansion rates of the barbarian periphery de-
cline to zero. However, the rates of technological development (including the 
growth rates of military technologies) of civilization continue to outpace those 
for the barbarian periphery. As a result, the military potential of civilization 
begins to exceed that of the barbarian periphery, and the civilization begins its 
counterattack (with the level of 1.23 million km2) in year 2048 of our simula-
tion. At first it proceeds very slowly (only 1.5 km2 during the first year of 
the ‘counterattack’); but the beginning of civilization counterattack leads to the 
formation of a system of positive feedbacks (described in Fig. 8), giving more 
and more noticeable results every year, – growth of the civilization territory 
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leads to the increase in its population which leads to the growth of military po-
tential both directly and through acсeleration of technological growth rates; the 
growth of military potential of civilization leads to further increase in its popu-
lation, which leads to further acceleration of growth of its territory, etc. As 
a result, the territory of civilization grows from the level of 1.23 million km2 
in year 2048 to 2.94 million km2 by the end of this phase at increasing (but 
still, in general, rather slow) rates.  
The growth rates of the total population of the World System continue to in-
crease throughout all the 6th Phase, but by very slow rates, increasing from 0.027 
to 0.12 % per year, still remaining lower than the rates characteristic of the be-
ginning of Phase 1. The population of the civilizational center continues to fall 
until year 1438 of our simulation, declining from 15.97 to 12.73 million, and 
then its growth resumes, and, by the end of the phase, the civilization population 
reaches 38.5 million, considerably exceeding the level reached at Phases 1–3. 
The reduction of technological growth rate of civilization continues till year 
1439 of the simulation (declining from 0.05 to 0.04 % a year), and then this rate 
begins to grow rapidly, reaching the level of 0.12 % per year by 2885 (i.e., it 
considerably exceeds the level reached at Phases 1–3). The World System urban 
population continues to decline till year 1169 of the simulation (decreasing from 
344,000 to 320,000 people, then its growth is resumed, gradually accelerating, 
and, by the end of Phase 6, the urban population of the World System reaches 
2,340,000). The World System urbanization index continues to fall much long-
er – till year 1600 of our simulation, declining from 0.0095 to 0.0074; and then it 
begins to grow with gradual acceleration, reaching the level of 0.0206 by the end 
of Phase 6. 
Phase 7 (years 2885–3209 of the simulation). As a result of a vigorous 
counterattack civilization completely subordinates Zone 2, absorbing the whole 
barbarian periphery.  
During this phase, there is a rapid growth of all the modeled indicators of the 
level of development of the World System. By year 3065 of the computer simu-
lation the urban population of the World System reaches the level of 10 million, 
and the World System urbanization index exceeds 10 % in 3123. In reality at 
this level, civilization already have to contact with the extensive hinterland of 
the World System (which during our simulation managed to achieve rather high 
levels of population and technological development), whereas the World Sys-
tem hinterland would transform into the new barbarian periphery of civiliza-
tion, which, with certain values of parameters, could lead to a new counterat-
tack of the barbarian periphery at a higher level. However, it would lead to ad-
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ditional complication of the model from which we have decided to refrain at 
this stage.26 
It is interesting that correlation between technological development and ur-
banization of the World System generated by this model is surprisingly similar 
to what we have seen above (see Fig. 4) for the empirical estimates of the level 
of technological development of the World System, on the one hand, and the 
level of its urbanization, on the other (see Figs 12–14):  
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Fig. 12. Correlation between values of the World System technologi-
cal development index (T) and the World System urbaniza-
tion index generated by the model (u) 
                                                          
26 This model also does not describe the withdrawal of the World-System from the blow-up regime. 
In theory, in our case it might be possible, having described basic population dynamics by means 
of the following equations: dN/dt = r·dT/dt · (1–l); dN/dt  0,04; dl/dt = s·dT/dt · (1–l) (where l is 
a proportion of literate population, and r and s are constants), and basic urbanization dynamics – 
by means of the following equations: du/dt = v·dT/dt × (ulim – u) (where ulim is a maximum possi-
ble share of urban population, and v is a constant); justification of the equations of this type, see, 
e.g., in the following works: Korotayev 2006a; Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2007; Koro-
tayev, Komarova, and Khaltourina 2007. However, we decided not to do it in order to avoid the 
excessive complication of the model especially since it does not include the description of with-
drawal of the World-System from the blow-up regime, and mathematical models with such a de-
scription have been already offered and published by us earlier (see e.g., Korotayev 2006; Koro-
tayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2007; Korotayev, Komarova, and Khaltourina 2007).  
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Fig. 13. Correlation between the empirical estimates of the index of 
the World System technological development (T) and the 
empirical estimates of the World System urbanization index 
(u) (3500 BCE – 1970 CE) 
In this figure, most part of the curve up to 430 BCE looks like a solid black 
spot. However, after ‘zooming’ in this spot, it is possible to see that the curve in 
this sector has a form that is surprisingly similar to the one of the whole graph – 
a sort of fractal effect (see Fig. 14): 
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Fig. 14. Correlation between the empirical index of the World System 
technological development (T) and the World System urba- 
nization index (u) (3500 BCE – 210 BCE) 
As we see, the shapes of all the three curves are amazingly similar: in the initial 
part of the figure even rather small technological growth is followed by very 
noticeable growth of urbanization of the World System. Then it is followed 
by a pronounced interval when further technological growth is accompanied by 
decrease of the urbanization level, which is changed by an interval where tech-
nological growth is accompanied by slow growth of urbanization which is fol-
lowed by a stretch where technological growth is accompanied by rapid growth 
of urbanization with a subsequent new interval of relative slowdown.  
It is worthy of note that formal indicators of correlation for model values of 
these two variables (R = 0.95, R2 = 0.903) are almost identical to those for cor-
relation calculated by us (see note to Fig. 4) for empirical values of these vari- 
ables. 
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Perhaps, it is not a pure coincidence, as this correlation both in our model 
and in reality in many respects was generated by similar mechanisms. Thus, 
the impact of the barbarian periphery on the central (‘civilized’) territories of 
the World System in the 1st millennium CE led to noticeable barbarization and 
de-urbanization of many of these zones as a result of which the World System 
urbanization index considerably decreased. At the same time, the rates of tech-
nological growth (both in our model and in reality) decreased, but technological 
growth did not stop completely since at that time new inventions and discover-
ies continued to be made (especially in those zones of the World System which 
underwent de-urbanization least of all). As a result, at that time the decrease 
in the level of urbanization was followed by some (albeit decelerated) growth of 
the level of its technological development, which caused an apparent negative 
correlation reducing general level of the general positive correlation between 
the variables in question.  
Note that, in our computer simulation, the final phases of conquest of the 
barbarian periphery by civilization are not deprived of some dramatism. The 
matter is that, not long before the end of the full conquest of the barbarian pe-
riphery by civilization, its asabiyyah falls to zero (‘dizziness with success’?) 
which leads to a fast and powerful counterattack of the barbarian periphery, 
burst of civilization asabiyyah and even more rapid final submission of the bar-
barian periphery (Fig. 15): 
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Fig. 15. Dynamics of the civilization territory before the final con-
quest of barbarian periphery (years 3170–3209 of our com-
puter simulation) 
In our opinion, quite a probable scenario of events is modeled here; however, 
fortunately, it does not appear to have been ever realized in real history of the 
World System (though the events of 9/11, perhaps, can serve here as a slightly 
resembling analogue).  
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*  *  * 
The numerical study of influence of parameter values on the dynamics of our 
model shows that the key parameters determining the length of phases are as 
follows: the coefficient of innovative activity (h in Eq. 8) defining the rates of 
technological growth; the coefficient of territorial expansion (a in Eq. 1); the 
coefficient of borrowing technologies of civilization by ‘barbarians’ (k in 
Eq. 17) and in particular military technologies (n in Eq. 19); the coefficient of 
dynamics of asabiyyah (e in Eqs 4 and 5), and also the relationship between the 
coefficient of military participation of barbarians (b) and civilization (c).  
Small reduction of the value of coefficient h with respect to the value men-
tioned in the note to Figs 6–8 leads to some reduction of duration of phases 1–3 
and significant increase in duration of other phases, but first of all of Phase 6 
(‘relative equilibrium of forces’); with reduction in coefficient of technological 
development (h) the rates of historical development are slowing down (see 
Fig. 16). 
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a) h = 0.0000315 b) h = 0.0000310 
Fig. 16. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilizational 
center generated by model (millions km2) with a small de-
crease in the coefficient of technological growth (h) 
Small reduction of the coefficient of territorial expansion (a, Fig. 17), or small 
increase in values of the coefficient of asabiyyah dynamics (e, Fig. 18), coeffi-
cient of borrowing of civilization technologies by ‘barbarians’ (k, Fig. 19) and, 
in particular, military technologies (n, Fig. 20), and also small increase in gap 
between the coefficients of military participation of population of the barbarian 
periphery and civilizational core (b/c, Fig. 21), small reduction of initial values 
of the level of technological development of civilization (Tc0, Fig. 22), its terri-
tories and asabiyyah, and also small increase in the initial values of the level of 
technological development, territory, and asabiyyah of the barbarian periphery 
produce similar results. 
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a) a = 0.0120 b) a = 0.0094 
Fig. 17. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilizational 
center generated by model (millions km2) with a small de-
crease in the coefficient of the territorial expansion (a) 
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Fig. 18. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilizational 
center generated by the model (in millions km2) with a small 
increase in the coefficient of asabiyyah dynamics (e) 
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a) k = 0.000504  b) k = 0.000517  
Fig. 19. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilizational 
center generated by the model (in millions km2) with a small 
increase in the value of overall coefficient of the borrowing 
of civilization technologies by ‘barbarians’ (k) 
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a) n = 0.000504  b) n = 0.000525  
Fig. 20. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilizational 
center of generated by the model (in millions km2) with 
a small increase in the value of the coefficient of borrowing 
of civilization military technologies by ‘barbarians’ (n) 
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a) с = 0.05; b = 0.2000  b) с = 0.05; b = 0.2027  
Fig. 21. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilizational 
center generated by the model (in millions km2) with a small 
increase in the gap between the military participation ratio 
of barbarian periphery and civilizational core (b/c) 
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a) Tc0 = 10 b) Tc0 = 9.9  
Fig. 22. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilizational 
center generated by the model (in millions km2) with a small 
reduction of initial value of the level of civilization technolo- 
gical development (Tc0) 
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The above described small changes of parameters and initial conditions of the 
model lead to the reduction of sizes of territory to which control of civilization 
extends during the first wave of its expansion (Phases 1–2.5), and also to in-
crease in duration and intensity of counterattack of the barbarian periphery 
(Phases 2,5–5,5). As a result, the zone remaining under control of civilization 
at the maximum of barbarian counter-expansion is reduced. The further change 
of parameters and initial conditions in this direction leads to significant chan- 
ges of the overall picture of dynamics and implementation of a significantly 
different scenario. If (as a result of the barbarian expansion) the civilization 
zone is reduced to the level below 1 million km2, it means that in the respective 
model simulation the barbarian periphery manages to conquer a part of the nu-
clear civilization zone (Zone 1) with an especially high natural productivity. As 
one can see in the model simulation, this leads to a very pronounced strength-
ening of barbarians (even at the phase when their counterattack approaches its 
exhaustion) and to a very serious weakening of civilization. In our simulations, 
the civilization could only launch a counterattack if barbarians managed to take 
no more than 1–2 % of Zone 1. Otherwise sharp strengthening of barbarians 
together with sharp weakening of civilization leads to a new acceleration of 
barbarian expansion and rapid final conquest of civilization by barbarians. 
Thus, a new phase is added (Phase 6’ – the phase of the new acceleration of 
barbarian expansion and final conquest of the civilization by barbarians), and 
Phases 6.5–7 disappear. 
Further reduction of the coefficient of territorial expansion (a) reduces the 
size of the territory which is under control of civilization at the peak of its terri-
torial expansion, but at the same time postpones ‘barbarian occupation’, pro-
longing the life of civilization (see Fig. 23).  
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a) a = 0.009 b) a = 0.001 
Fig. 23. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilizational 
center generated by the model (in million km2) at considera-
ble decrease in the coefficient of territorial expansion (a) 
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On the other hand, further reduction of the coefficient of innovative activity (h) 
or increase in the values of the coefficient of asabiyyah dynamics (e), the coef-
ficient of borrowing technologies of civilization by ‘barbarians’ (k) (and, in 
particular, military technologies (n)), as well as further increases in the gap 
between coefficients of military participation of population of the barbarian 
periphery and civilizational core (b/c), further reduction of the initial values of 
the level of technological development of civilization (Tc0, Fig. 22), its territory 
and asabiyyah, and also further increase in initial values of the level of techno-
logical development, territory, and asabiyyah of the barbarian periphery lead to 
reduction of the ‘life of civilization’, to its more rapid conquest by barbarians 
(Figs 24–30):  
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Fig. 24. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilization cen-
ter generated by the model (in millions km2) with a considera-
ble decrease in the coefficient of technological growth (h) 
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Fig. 25. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilization 
center generated by the model (in millions km2) with a sig-
nificant increase in the coefficient of asabiyyah dynamics (e) 
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Fig. 26. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilization 
center generated by the model (in millions km2) with a sig-
nificant increase in the value of general coefficient of bor-
rowing of civilization technologies (k) by ‘barbarians’ 
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Fig. 27. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilization 
center generated by the model (in millions km2) with a sig-
nificant increase in the value of coefficient of borrowing of 
military technologies of civilization by ‘barbarians’ (n)  
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a) с = 0.05; b = 0.21 b) с = 0.02; b = 0.25 
Fig. 28. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilization 
center generated by the model (in millions km2) with a sig-
nificant increase in the gap between military participation 
ratios of the population of barbarian periphery and civiliza-
tional core (b/c) 
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Fig. 29. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilization 
center (in millions km2) generated by the model with a con-
siderable reduction of the initial value of the level of techno-
logical development of civilization (Tc0)  
It is obvious that with such values of parameters the model describes quite 
a real scenario. Indeed, with a certain set of parameters the expansion of civili-
zation could create such a powerful barbarian periphery that its counterattack 
could be able to destroy this civilization (the classic example here is the con-
quest by barbarians of Rome, expansion of which in many respects gave bar-
barians that very strength which eventually helped them to break down their 
formidable opponent [see, e.g., Turchin 2005]).  
Beyond a certain limit we get a scenario of more and more rapid conquest 
of civilization by barbarians already without a phase of the initial civilizational 
expansion (see Fig. 30).27 
                                                          
27 We should also note that the change of parameters of the model in this direction is after all mean-
ingful only to a certain degree. Say, the coefficient of military participation of barbarians (b), 
cannot by definition exceed 1.0, but even 1.0 describes an unrealistic scenario because the entire 
population of any society (including, as we know, newborn babies and very old men and women) 
cannot actually take part in combat. Similar restrictions also exist for all other parameters and in-
itial conditions of the model.  
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a) с = 0.01; b = 0.4  b) Hb0 = 2  
Fig. 30. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilization 
center generated by the model (in millions km2) with a large 
gap in coefficients of military participation and very high ini-
tial value of ‘barbarians’ asabiyyah  
In this case we have already a rather banal scenario of the final conquest of 
civilization by barbarians whose military superiority has already been deter-
mined by initial parameters and initial conditions, while civilization (with the 
same parameters and initial conditions) has no chance to effectively resist the bar- 
barian expansion.28 
In case of little change of parameters and initial conditions in the opposite 
direction29 (in relation to the parameters and initial conditions described in the 
note to Figs 5–7) we will see in our computer simulations some increase in du-
                                                          
28 At the same time, say, if the conquest of civilization by ‘barbarians’ within the model is brought 
about by assigning to ‘barbarians’ a higher initial value of asabiyya (H), it can already be inter-
preted within Ibn Khaldun's tradition (see, e.g., Ibn Khaldun 1958, 2004; Batsieva 1965; Ig-
natenko 1980; Alekseev and Khaltourina 2004; Turchin 2003, 2007; Korotayev and Khaltourina 
2006; Korotayev 2006e, 2007c, 2007d; Inan 1933; Mahdi 1937) as the conquest of a low-
assabiyyah civilization by high-asabiyyah barbarians, which does not ‘end the history’, but be-
gins its new round, a new ‘Khaldunian’ dynastic cycle, but this will be quite a different model.  
29 That is with a small increase of the coefficient of technological growth (h) and the coefficient of 
territorial expansion (a), or with a small reduction of the values of the coefficient of asabiyyah 
dynamics (e), the coefficient of borrowing of civilization technologies by ‘barbarians’ (k) and, 
in particular, military technologies (n), and also with a small decrease of the gap between mili-
tary participation ratios of the barbarian periphery and civilizational core (b/c), with a small in-
crease in the initial values of the level of technological development of civilization (Tc0, 
Fig. 22), its territory and asabiyyah, and also with a small reduction of the initial values of the 
level of technological development, territory and asabiyyah of the barbarian periphery.  
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ration of phases of the initial expansion of civilization, the territory occupied by 
it during expansion (as well as the territory retained by it at the peak of ‘barbar-
ian’ counterattack), and reduction of duration of all subsequent phases, and in 
particular Phase 6 (‘relative balance of forces’) (Figs 31–37): 
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a) h = 0.0000315 b) h = 0.0000330 
Fig. 31. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilization 
center generated by the model (in millions km2) with 
a small increase in coefficient of technological growth (h) 
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Fig. 32. Dynamics of the area of the territory of the World System 
civilization center generated by the model (in millions km2) 
with a small increase in the coefficient of territorial expan-
sion (a) 
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a) e = 0.0520 b) e = 0.0505 
Fig. 33. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilization 
center generated by the model (in millions km2) with a small 
reduction of the coefficient of asabiyyah dynamics (e) 
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a) k = 0.000504  b) k = 0.000465  
Fig. 34. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilization 
center generated by the model (in millions km2) with a small 
reduction of the value of the general coefficient of borrowing 
of civilization technologies by ‘barbarians’ (k) 
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a) n = 0.000504  b) n = 0.000440  
Fig. 35. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilization cen-
ter generated by the model (in millions km2) with a small re-
duction of the value of the coefficient of the borrowing of mi- 
litary technologies of civilization by ‘barbarians’ (n) 
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a) с = 0.05; b = 0.20  b) с = 0.05; b = 0.19  
Fig. 36. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilization cen-
ter generated by the model (in millions km2) with a small re-
duction of gap between military participation ratios of barbari-
an periphery and civilizational core (b/c) 
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a) Tc0 = 10  b) Tc0 = 10.4  
Fig. 37. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilization 
center generated by the model (in millions km2) with a small 
increase in the initial value of the level of technological de-
velopment of civilization (Tc0) 
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In case of further changes of  parameters in this direction (and, in particular, 
with their combined changing) one can observe a further increase in duration 
of phases of the initial expansion of civilization, the area of the territory occu-
pied by it during the first expansion phases (as well as the territory kept by it 
at the peak of ‘barbarian’ counterattack), and reduction of duration of all sub-
sequent phases, and in particular Phase 6 (‘relative balance of forces’). Gradu-
ally duration of phases 3–6 reduces to zero, and they disappear, whereas phas-
es 1–2 eventually merge with phase 7. As a result, we have only phase 1, and 
further change of parameters in this direction leads only to reduction of the 
period of time which is required for civilization to conquer its barbarian pe-
riphery (Figs 38–41):  
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a) h = 0.00004 b) h = 0.00005 
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Fig. 38. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilization cen-
ter generated by the model (in millions km2) with a significant 
increase in the coefficient of technological growth (h) 
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a) e = 0.0475 b) e = 0.0450 
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c) e = 0.0400 d) e = 0.0100 
Fig. 39. Dynamics of the territory e of the World System civilization 
center generated by the model (in millions km2) with a consi- 
derable reduction of the coefficient of asabiyyah dynamics (e) 
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a) Tc0 = 12  b) Tc0 = 15  
Fig. 40. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilization 
center generated by the model (in millions km2) with a large 
increase in the initial value of the level of technological de-
velopment of civilization (Tc0) 
 A Model of Center-Periphery Interaction  192
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
0 20 40 60 80 100
 
a) e = 0.04; Tc0 = 12 b) e = 0.01; Tc0 = 15 
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с) e = 0.005; Tc0 = 20 d) e = 0.001; Tc0 = 50 
Fig. 41. Dynamics of the territory of the World System civilization 
center generated by the model (in millions km2) with a sim-
ultaneous considerable reduction of the coefficient of asa-
biyyah dynamics (e) and a large increase in the initial value 
of the level of technological development of civilization (Tc0) 
Let us note that in all cases we deal with quite real scenarios of interaction be-
tween civilizational center and barbarian periphery. In fact if a technologically 
highly developed (and, in addition, rapidly developing) civilization came in 
contact with such a  periphery which was extremely undeveloped technologi-
cally and incapable of borrowing technologies of civilization rather quickly, it 
led to the accelerated conquest by civilization of its periphery that was incapa-
ble to produce any effective resistance to advancing civilization (the British 
colonization of Australia presents a rather salient example of such a scenario). 
Thus, depending on the given parameters and initial conditions the offered 
model can describe mathematically seven significantly different scenarios of the 
interaction between civilizational center and barbarian periphery (see Table 2): 
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Table 2. Scenarios of interaction between civilization center and bar-
barian periphery described by the model depending on the 
given parameters and initial conditions 
Description of scenario Values of parameters and initial conditions 
1. Accelerated conquest of the barbarian 
periphery by civilization  
Very high values of coefficients of techno-
logical growth (h), territorial expansion (a), 
very low values of coefficients of dynamics 
of asabiyyah (e), borrowing of civilization 
technologies by ‘barbarians’ (k) and, in par-
ticular, military technologies (n), very small 
gap between coefficients of military partici-
pation of population of the barbarian periph-
ery and civilizational core (b/c), very high 
initial values of the level of technological 
development of civilization (Tc0), its territo-
ry (Ac0) and asabiyyah (Hc0); very low initial 
values of the level of technological devel-
opment (Tb0), territory (Ab0) and asabiyyah 
(Hb0) of the barbarian periphery
2. The phase of the accelerated expansion 
of civilization is followed by the phase of 
its slowdown caused by more and more 
effective counteraction of ‘barbarians’ 
who, nevertheless, are not able to mount 
a counterattack  
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
↓ 
3. The phase of accelerated and deep ex-
pansion of civilization and phase of its 
slow-down is followed by rather short-
term and shallow counterattack of ‘bar-
barians’ which is succeeded by the phase 
of final submission of barbarian periphery 
4. The phase of still accelerating but less 
deep expansion of civilization and the 
phase of its slowdown is followed 
by the phase of a long and deep offensive 
of ‘barbarians’ which is succeeded by 
a long phase of relative balance of forces 
which is followed by the phase of final 
submission of the barbarian periphery by 
civilization 
5. The phase of less and less accelerating 
and deep expansion of civilization and 
the phase of its slow-down is followed 
by the phase of the long and deep offen-
sive of ‘barbarians’ which is gradually 
slowed down by more and more effective 
counteraction of civilization which, 
nevertheless, is not able to prevent its 
complete conquest by barbarians 
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Description of scenario Values of parameters and initial conditions 
6. The phase of rather shallow slowing 
down expansion of civilization is followed 
by the phase of accelerated advance of 
‘barbarians’ which results in the conquest 
of civilization by the ‘barbarians’ 
 
7. As a result of a rapid, increasingly 
accelerating offensive, the barbarians 
conquer civilization  
Very low values of the coefficient of techno-
logical growth (h) and the coefficient of the 
territorial expansion (a); very high values 
of the coefficient of dynamics of asabiy- 
yah (e), the coefficient of borrowing of civi-
lization technologies (k) by ‘barbarians’ and, 
in particular, military technologies (n); 
a wide gap between military participation 
ratios of the barbarian periphery and civili-
zational core (b/c); very low initial values 
of the level of technological development of 
civilization (Tc0), its territory (Ac0) and asa-
biyyah (Hc0); very high initial values 
of the level of technological development 
(Tb0), territory (Ab0) and asabiyyah (Hb0) 
of the barbarian periphery 
Thus, the scenario displayed above in Figs 5–7 and most precisely describing 
the influence of interaction between the civilization center and barbarian pe-
riphery on the World System development is intermediate among the above-
described scenarios. One can suppose that this is not a coincidence. In fact, 
there are some grounds to maintain that this interaction could have the histor-
ically attested impact only with intermediate values of parameters. Barbari- 
ans could not confront effectively the expansion of civilizational and launch 
a massive counterattack with very low values of coefficients e, k, n and b, i.e., 
if their collective solidarity were not sufficiently amplified under the influ-
ence of pressure of civilization, if they had not been able to adopt vitally im-
portant technologies of civilization (including military ones) quickly enough, 
if they had not have a much higher military participation ratio. On the other 
hand, a too high value of these parameters would not have made the expan-
sion of civilization of the World System possible, or would have even led (at 
especially high values of these parameters) to rapid conquest of civilization 
by barbarians before the civilization expansion could start. One can say the 
same about the values of all the other significant parameters of the model, 
and also about the values of the initial conditions (e.g., if at the time of clash 
of civilization with the barbarian periphery the relative level of its technolo- 
gical development had been too low, it would not have been able to begin 
expansion at all, and with an extremely high value it would have rapidly sub-
ordinated the periphery that would be incapable of offering any effective re-
sistance).  
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On the other hand, we can easily see that practically all the scenarios de-
scribed above were observed in the history of the World System at the level of 
some specific civilization zones and their peripheries. In many respects this is 
precisely why the total dynamics of the World System appears to be the closest 
to the intermediate scenario of the model.  
Of course, in our case the fit of theoretical curve with empirical estimates 
is still far from being ideal – which is not surprising since nobody would claim 
that the interaction between civilization core of the World System and its bar-
barian periphery was the only factor that defined the characteristic form of the 
curve of world urbanization dynamics.  
What is really surprising for us, is the fact that the offered model after all 
appeared capable to describe the general form of this dynamics so precisely 
(though, of course, imperfectly). Hence, this suggests that the interaction be-
tween the civilization core of the World System and its barbarian periphery was 
really an important factor making a notable contribution (until very recently) to 
giving the peculiar form to the curve of the world urbanization dynamics. 
The proposed model suggests that in the history of the World System de-
velopment the important component of World System phase transitions А1 and 
А2 could be not only the movement of its core to a new level of complexity, but 
also the formation of barbarian periphery of an essentially new type capable to 
offer much more effective resistance to civilization expansion and to mount 
successful counterattacks that apparently could make a noticeable contribution 
to the formation of the ‘attractor effect’ during periods В1 and В2.  
There are also some more points that seem to be capable to explain why 
this model which takes into account only one factor of the World System dy-
namics (and not always the most important one), was able to generate the curve 
so well describing empirically observed historical macrodynamics. The fact is 
that this model, most likely, describes general development logic of the World 
System within which the hyperbolic growth of its civilizational core creates 
powerful forces restricting this growth at certain phases of the World System 
development (or, to be more exact, moving the World System to a new, lower, 
hyperbolic trajectory) (see, e.g., Korotayev 2006d, 2007; Korotayev, Malkov, 
and Khaltourina 2007; Grinin and Korotayev 2009b).  
For example, one of such factors (which influenced dynamics of the World 
System in Phase В2 probably, not lesser, if even not greater than the effect of 
interaction between civilization center and barbarian periphery) was earlier 
described by us as follows: 
The growth of the World System population by the end of the 1st millen-
nium BCE up to 9-digit numbers produced a breeding ground that led to 
an almost inevitable appearance of a new generation of more lethal and 
epidemically destructive pathogens that could not reproduce themselves 
in smaller populations (Diamond 1999: 202–205; McNeill 1993; Koro-
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tayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2005: 105–113; 2006a), whereas the 
level of health care technologies achieved by the World System by the 
beginning of the 1st millennium CE turned out to be totally inadequate 
for the radically increased level of pathogen threat. Thus, the Antonine 
and Justinian's pandemics led to global depopulations of the 2nd and 
6th centuries, contributing in a very significant way to the slowdown of 
the World System demographic growth in the 1st millennium CE. Note 
that due to this, since the early 1st millennium CE the role of health care 
technologies as a determinant of the carrying capacity of the Earth dra-
matically increases, which at least partly accounts for the change 
of the hyperbolic growth regime’ (Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 
2006b: 159; 2007: 206). 
It is very important that the logic of action of this factor is extremely similar to 
the logic of action of the factor analyzed in this article. In the both cases, the 
hyperbolic growth of civilization creates powerful forces that block this growth. 
On the other hand, the pressure of the barbarian periphery was able to stimu- 
late the growth of military potential of civilization, whereas pathogenic attacks 
on the World System eventually stimulated development of health care tech-
nologies which allowed the World System to repulse these attacks more suc-
cessfully and renew its hyperbolic growth.30 
The logic of this factor is similar to the logic of another factor (which, ap-
parently, had an even greater influence on the World System dynamics World 
System in phase В1,than the effect of interaction between the civilizational cen-
ter and barbarian periphery) – the factor of environmental degradation under 
the influence of the hyperbolic growth of civilization. This factor is most evi-
dent in the history of ancient Mesopotamia (whose curve of urbanization dy-
namics in the 4th – early 2nd millennia BCE defined the general shape of the 
World System urbanization dynamics curve to a very considerable extent). As 
is well known, the explosive growth of civilization in this region led to cata-
strophic soil salination in its most developed zone, in Lower Mesopotamia, 
which, in turn, led to decrease in rates of demographic and urbanization growth 
here up to negative values in the middle of the 3rd millennium. On the other 
hand, environmental degradation stimulated the technological growth here 
which in the 1st millennium CE led to the restoration of the carrying capacity 
values here up to the levels of the beginning of the 3rd millennium BCE, and 
then to its noticeable expansion (Dyakonov 1983: 272, 330; Chubarov 1991; 
Roberts 1998: 175).  
                                                          
30 It appears appropriate to recollect at this point that this growth continued up to the early 1970s 
when the World-System started to withdraw from the hyperbolic growth regime (i.e., the blow-
up regime) due to force created by its hyperbolic growth, but these were forces of another kind 
(Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a, 2006b, 2007).  
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These facts explain to some extent a paradox that can be noticed above in 
Figs 1–2, 5–7, and 12–14. The point is that in order that the interaction of civi-
lization center and barbarian periphery could produce an effect that is similar to 
the one that is actually observed, the territory under the control of civilization 
should be decreased manifold and remain at an extremely low level for a very 
long period of time, which apparently did not happen in reality. Apparently, 
what was not ‘consumed’ by ‘barbarians’ at ‘sinks’ in Figs. 1–2 corresponding 
to the phases В1 и В2 was mostly ‘eaten away’ additionally by pathogenic at-
tacks and environmental degradation.  
Finally, let us dwell upon some other factors that seem to be relevant for 
modeling of the long-term dynamics of the World System. One of these factors 
was described by us earlier as follows: 
Some hint here seems to be suggested by mathematical models (0.11)-
(0.13)-(0.12) and (0.13)-(0.14)31 described in the Introduction. Accord-
ing to these models any long-term decrease of per capita surplus (S) 
must lead to the decrease of population growth rates and, hence, the 
slow-down of technological growth. In the meantime, by the end of 
the Axial Age we seem to observe a World System trend towards the de-
cline of precisely this indicator. This was connected not with decline of 
production, but rather with the growth of m, the per capita product that 
is necessary for the population reproduction with zero growth rate, the 
‘minimum necessary product’ (MNP). In the 1st millennium BCE 
the rapid population growth sustained the hyperbolic growth of the 
complexity of sociopolitical infrastructures (on the other hand, of course, 
the hyperbolic population growth was also sustained by a hyperbolic 
growth of sociopolitical complexity – once more we are dealing here 
with the positive feedback phenomenon). However, the radical increase 
in sociopolitical complexity meant a radical increase in the MNP, as the 
substantial expenses necessary for the normal functioning of these socio- 
political infrastructures should be regarded, in this context, as a part of 
the minimum necessary product (rather than as surplus). Indeed, by the 
end of the 1st millennium BCE the World System population reached 
9-digit numbers; even a simple reproduction (at zero growth rate) of so 
huge a population required maintenance of normal functioning of all 
those infrastructures (transportation, judicial, administrative and other 
such subsystems). Within such a context, if the product produced this 
year by a peasant is only sufficient to secure the survival of himself and 
his household, but not sufficient to pay any taxes, it is impossible to say 
that this peasant has produced this year the minimum necessary pro- 
duct. In fact, what he has produced this year is smaller than the MNP. 
Indeed, as the experience of post-Axial centuries showed on numerous 
occasions, in supercomplex agrarian societies the decrease of per capita 
                                                          
31 These numbers refer to equations presented in the Introduction (Korotayev, Malkov, and Khalto-
urina 2006b).  
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production (usually as a result of relative overpopulation) down to a lev-
el that did not allow the population to pay taxes led to the disintegration 
of sociopolitical infrastructures and demographic collapse (see Koro- 
tayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006b: Chapters 1–432). There are 
grounds to maintain that the rapid growth of the MNP in the 1st millen-
nium BCE exceeded the growth of the equilibrium per capita production, 
which resulted in the long-term decrease of real S, and, hence, the de-
crease of the World System population growth rates. On the other hand, 
it led to the decrease of sociopolitical system stability, and, hence, to the 
increase in the importance of the role of cyclical and chaotic components 
of the macrohistorical dynamics in comparison with the trend compo- 
nent (Ibid.: 159–160; 2007: 206–207). 
Obviously, in this case we also deal with a force that was created by the hy-
perbolic growth of the World System and that blocked for some time the fur- 
ther hyperbolic growth of the World System.  
In conclusion, we would like to make a few additional comments. We are 
well aware of the fact that many assumptions of our model simplify (sometimes 
even over-simplify) the situation observed in historical reality. It is worth poin- 
ting out some of such assumptions and points which should be developed, sys-
tematized and considered in future generations of models of interaction between 
civilization center and barbarian periphery. 
First of all, one should note that one of the strongest simplifications of the 
model was that the World System consisted of only one civilization and only 
one barbarian periphery (though in history we naturally deal with a number of 
civilizations and barbarian peripheries surrounding them). Taking into conside- 
ration the multiplicity of civilizations may become one of the leading directions 
of further development of our model. It could also be possible to present some 
typology of both civilizations, and barbarian peripheries and to use this typolo-
gy for explanation of characteristic features of the World System dynamics 
both within basins of attraction, and during phase transitions. 
For example, it would be worth dividing barbarian periphery into two types. 
The first one is represented by barbarians-agriculturalists; the second one is by 
barbarians-herders (nomads). This point is important with respect to the level of 
the world urbanization, because nomadic population constituted a rather small 
fraction of the global population, whereas barbarians-farmers could constitute 
a substantially higher percentage (e.g., according to some estimates, the popula-
tion of Gaul before the Roman conquest was between 5 and 10 million [see, e.g., 
Braudel 1995: 61–62]). Note that the transition of nomads, semi-nomads and 
extensive farmers to settled intensive agriculture appears to have greatly in- 
fluenced the population dynamics of the World System. Apparently, period В1 is 
                                                          
32 See also, e.g., Nefedov 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2013; Turchin 2003: 121–127; 
Turchin and Nefedov 2009.  
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characteristic of such transition (in particular, in India among Indo-Aryans, 
in Iran, among the Dorians in Greece, in a number of other areas of Europe, 
etc.). In other words, transformations of barbarian periphery could significantly 
change proportions in the world population and its urbanization due to population 
growth of the barbarian periphery (which is considered only partially in the pre-
sent version of the model). 
At the initial stage (the first two thirds of the 1st millennium CE), period В2 
was connected with absorption by the civilization center of the huge number of 
barbarians who intruded in its territory. However, it appears necessary to take 
here into account the difference between complex agrarian societies of B1 period 
and supercomplex agrarian systems of В2 period in respect of the economic role 
of cities.  
In typology of civilization centers it appears important to distinguish be-
tween irrigation and non-irrigation civilizations. It is very important due to signi- 
ficant differences in the processes of their urbanization. In particular, three func-
tions of cities in the regions of river civilizations were more developed than in 
other places: economic, redistributive and sacral. And that fact made the cities 
actually a part of agrarian technology within civilization whereas cities could not 
act as such an integral element elsewhere. Moreover, the politically centralizing 
role of the cities in irrigation civilizations was also higher, and non-irrigation ag-
ricultural civilizations had more opportunities to remain decentralized without 
great losses for efficiency of functioning of their economy. As a result, the elite of 
irrigation civilizations was to a greater extent urban, and the elite of non-irrigation 
civilizations might be rural to a greater extent (e.g., in the medieval Islamic Mid-
dle East the elite was generally urban, and in medieval Europe it was rural to 
a greater degree). Thus, the character of civilizations and barbarian periphery at 
different stages might influence the level of urbanization. 
Distinguishing types of civilizations and barbarian peripheries could help 
us to achieve a significant clarification of typical reasons and variants of mili-
tary rivalry between civilizations and barbarians. In particular, it is possible to 
preliminarily outline the reasons which forced civilizations and states to make 
the expansion to the barbarian periphery (the reasons of attacks of barbarians 
against civilizations will be discussed later):  
1) Attempts to eliminate dangerous centers of constant concern and at-
tacks. It was one of the main reasons of Chinese campaigns against Xiongnu, 
Russian campaigns against Cumans, etc. 
2) Attempts to bring back territories occupied by barbarians. 
3) Campaigns to seize slaves and booty (were characteristic of a number of 
African states). This type of campaigns includes the attacks for the purpose 
of getting tribute and necessary goods, strategic raw materials, etc. For exam-
ple, the expansion of Russians to the North and Siberia was largely determined 
by their need for furs. 
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4) Campaigns with hegemonic purposes – ‘in pursuit of power’. It was an 
important reason for which the Persian king Darius I tried to conquer Scythians.  
5) Campaigns and conquests with some strategic aim (improvement of the 
situation, acquirement of favorable and convenient means of communication, 
elimination of potential danger, etc.). Among such cases one can mention con-
quests of Gaul and Dacia by Romans which were triggered by a special politi-
cal situation, the involvement of these people into complex political game, at-
tempts of their threat to Romans or their allies, etc. In particular, a cause for 
Caesar's campaign to Gaul, as we know, was that the Sequani, which suffered 
defeat from the Aedui, called Germans (Suevi and others) for help in campaign 
led by Ariovist who not only successfully defeated the Aedui, but also began to 
enslave the Sequani. These events served as an important pretext for Romans 
to interfere in affairs of the Gauls (see: Caesar. The Gallic War I: 31–39). Con-
quests which were made under such circumstances were also very characteristic 
of Europeans of the Modern Period.  
6) Seizure of agricultural lands. One of examples are Charlenmagne's 
campaigns against the German and other barbarians, another one is the expan-
sion of the German knights to the Baltic States (a motive to seize lands for agri-
cultural purposes was especially salient in this case). One can add the expan-
sion of Carthage to Corsica, Sardinia and to Spain. It appears appropriate to 
notice in all these cases we deal with the expansion to the territories occupied 
by agriculturalists. And therefore it is very important to take into account (as 
this is done in our model) that the territory of the barbarian periphery was di-
vided, at least, into two types: 
• the territory more economically attractive to the civilization; 
• the territory less economically attractive.  
It is obvious that expansion to the second type of territories was not im-
portant for civilization in itself (this only became important when this periphery 
disturbed it). Not without reason China could refrain from such expansion for 
a long time. 
On the other hand, the systematic transition to intensive non-irrigation ag-
riculture (that was observed just in the 1st millennium BCE) might fully 
strengthen such expansion in its different types (for example, such was the case 
with Greek colonization which can be considered as one of the types of non-
military or partly military expansion). In general, if the expansion of civiliza-
tion to the barbarian periphery was in any way successful and prolonged, then 
as a rule it led to assimilation of barbarians.33 One should note that in future 
models it would be worthwhile introducing mathematical description of pro-
cesses of barbarians' assimilation in a more explicit way.  
                                                          
33 However, civilization could not assimilate those barbarians who lived in marginal (unsuitable or 
almost unsuitable for agriculture) zones.  
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Probably, expansion of civilization to the periphery was not vital for a num- 
ber of civilizations and played a subordinate role for them. However, such ex-
pansion was very important for the World System as a whole, which is shown 
in our model.  
One should also define different types of expansion of civilization to the 
barbarian periphery. For example, it is possible to speak about assimilating ex-
pansion which might happen without essential resistance of the peripheral peo-
ples. On the other hand, the more lands the civilization was bringing into its 
economic turnover, the more often it faced a more resistent and intractable (and 
at the same time less and less attractive economically) barbarian periphery.  
Probably, in future models it would make sense to include mathematical 
description of the expansion of some barbarians to the territory of others. If the 
lands of nomads are often economically unattractive for civilizations, they are 
almost always economically attractive to other nomads. But nomads can also 
attack barbarians-farmers (as it happened with the Huns who attacked the 
Goths). And such kind of expansion quite often causes great changes by 
the ‘domino’ principle leading to general expansion of barbarians against the 
civilization center.  
We have already mentioned above that the issue whether barbarians need 
or need not centralization for their successful expansion against the civilization 
has no unambiguous solution.  
Successful wars and especially conquests of neighboring states by barbari-
ans were quite often connected with successful centralization of barbarians (at 
least temporary) around some leader. It is relevant for the Xiongnu, the Mon-
gols, the German tribes, the Huns, and many others. Sometimes as a result of 
these perturbations the center strengthened and a large chiefdom emerged. 
However, if this centripetal movement was insufficiently steady to become 
permanent, the life cycle of a new large polity was short. Such fragile for-
mations as the Slavic Samo‘state’ (Lozny 1995: 86–87), the Germanic tribal 
unions of Maroboduus (among the Markomanni), Ariovistus (among the Sue-
vi), Arminius (among the Cherusci), Claudius Civilis (among the Batavians) 
(Neusykhin 1968: 601–602; Oosten 1996); the Hunnish ‘empire’ of Attila 
(Korsunsky and Günther 1984: 105–116); the Getae and Dacians union led by 
the ‘king’ Burebista (Fedorov and Polevoy 1984) and others usually disinte-
grated after the death of the charismatic leader (and sometimes during his life 
as it happened to Maroboduus). Sometimes one could observe the decline of 
the supreme power in analogues even before the death of such a leader, espe-
cially if there was a strong and self-willed elite. 
While considering the interaction between barbarians and civilization one 
should take into account the ambiguity of the solution of the issue of military 
and technological superiority of the latter over the former. Anyway, such a su-
periority was not always sufficient as barbarians could compensate it by sud-
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denness or other advantages. Before the wide diffusion of iron, civilizations 
having expensive and highly technological weapons (e.g., bronze arms) could 
not always successfully resist barbarians either, especially if civilizations were 
internally weakened.  
It is also worth mentioning the features of barbarian political formations in 
comparison with the states of civilization zone.  
Of particular interest are barbarian analogues of the early state where the 
political organism did not have rigidly fixed territory, more precisely, where 
socio-political organism can change its territory rather easily. Of course, it is 
much less characteristic for the states where the state control over a certain ter-
ritory is almost obligatory. The states seldom change the core of their territo-
ry.34 No matter how the borders of states change, the core usually remains the 
same, whereas barbarians, for example the Hungarians or the Goths (Shchukin 
2005, etc.), were able to move thousands of kilometers ‘in search for their 
home’. In some cases, an important cause for such migrations was constituted 
by population pressure. ‘A sharp increase in population density in settled agri-
cultural societies is well known, compared to the epoch of hunter-gatherers. It 
increased almost a hundredfold’ (Masson 1976: 102–104, 189; 1980: 182–183). 
The importance of demographic growth in increasing role of wars in the rela-
tions between societies is great. And wars can also lead to the development of 
new political forms (e.g., Grinin andKorotayev 2012; Turchin 2015). Not with-
out a reason Robert Carneiro constantly emphasizes that increased population 
pressure can lead to wars and conquests, therefore state organization emerges in 
certain cases and under certain circumstances (Carneiro 1970, 1978, 2000a, 
2002; 2006, 2012; see also: Lewis 1981). High population pressure quite often 
caused migrations and wars even among more populous state analogues. One of 
the most known examples is the huge polity of the Visigoths which suffered 
from relative overpopulation already under Hermanaricus in the middle of the 
4th century CE (Shchukin 2005: 219), which was the most important reason for 
their migration to Byzantium (note that this episode is often considered as the 
beginning of the Great Migration Period ). 
One should also take into consideration the point that barbarian periphery 
being more poor and backward aspires to the robbery of civilization to a greater 
extent, than vice versa. Arnold J. Toynbee (1991) (somewhat simplifying the 
reality) said that ‘external proletariat’, i.e. barbarian peoples, posed threat for 
civilization having ‘nothing to lose’ just as Marx’ proletariat, but they could 
gain lots of assets by attacking the civilization. This, of course, strengthened the 
barbarians' pressure.  
                                                          
34 One of such extremely rare examples was represented by the South African Dutch who moved 
their states far away from the British in 1836–1839 (see, e.g., Büttner 1981: 189–190). 
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It also appears appropriate to mention the role of wars in the life of barbar-
ian societies. As some researchers note, wars among hunter-gatherers were ob-
served a bit less frequently than among barbarians (Lesser 1968: 94; Korota-
yev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006b; Korotayev, Komarova, and Khaltourina 
2007: 143, 148). There is also a certain significant correlation between extreme 
living conditions and a low level of aggression (Kazankov 2002). Therefore, 
nomadic hunter-gatherers who live under especially extreme conditions can be 
mostly characterized as relatively peaceful societies. It greatly differs from the 
behavior of many nomadic herders living under extreme conditions and having 
small population density. The latter are just distinguished by especially high 
levels of aggression. Thus, aggression considerably increases with the transition 
to barbarism. As Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (who generally underestimate 
the role of wars in history) note in the German Ideology (2004 [1845–1846]: 
89), ‘with the conquering barbarian people war itself is still… a regular form of 
intercourse, which is the more eagerly exploited as the increase in population 
together with the traditional and, for it, the only possible, crude mode of pro-
duction gives rise to the need for new means of production’. 
It should also be noted that for barbarians (unlike for states/civilizations) ex-
ternal exploitation can play a significantly more important role than internal 
exploitation (see, e.g., Kradin 1992; Grinin 1997, 2003a). Many researchers em-
phasize that very often exploitation begins not inside, but outside the society 
since the stranger is protected by neither tradition, nor custom. External exploita-
tion strengthens inequality and, undoubtedly, promotes the development of poli-
togenesis. For example, K. Pietkiewicz notes that before the formation of the 
Lithuanian state two basic strata were found among the Lithuanians: free farmers 
and warriors (nobles) who were called kunigai, i.e., ‘dukes’, ‘lords’. ‘Dukes’ at-
tained material well-being and high positions in society through predatory wars, 
to a lesser extent through gathering tribute from their own population (Pietkie-
wicz 2006: 306). 
Acts of violence often played a very important role in the life of culturally 
simple farmers and herders. Such actions were one of the most important ways 
for individuals to raise their social status. For example, N. A. Butinov writes 
the following about the Papuans:  
There were two ways of advance up to high rankers: peaceful and mili-
tary; the second, probably, prevailed. The aspirant for a higher status 
brought together a group of men. Under his leadership they attacked 
neighboring villages, plundered, killed, subordinated survived to their 
power. The reason for attack was easy to invent (e.g., black magic, theft 
of pigs, abduction of women, disputes on the territory etc.). Justification 
of murder of aliens was not necessary, as it was considered a good deed. 
Intercommunal wars took place very often (Butinov 1995: 62). 
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Wars played a significant role even in the formation of simple chiefdoms (see 
Carneiro 1970, 1981, 2004, 2012). On the whole the ideas to occupy neighbor-
ing settlements by force of arms; to take prisoners and to force them to work as 
slaves; to demand periodic payment of a tribute’ were rather wide spread 
(though not universal) at that time (see, e.g., Carneiro 2004; see, however, 
Zinkina et al. 2016). 
Emergence or diffusion of some important technological innovations could 
lead to great changes in politogenesis and could become its accelerator. As 
a result, intensive politogenetic processes could begin in those places where 
politogenesis was strongly delayed or impossible at all before. As has been 
mentioned above, the role of such an accelerator might have been played by the 
diffusion of iron metallurgy, progress in using of mount or draught animals. 
Emergence of the cavalry, iron weapons, etc. also promoted ‘intensification’ of 
military operations, strengthened the role of wars in politogenesis.35 
The role of wars in some respects is especially significant in the develop-
ment and transformation of pre-state and state analogue barbarian societies. For 
most of relevant barbarian peoples, wars became the most important factor of 
their transformation into the state. A striking example was the state of the Zulu 
which at the beginning of the 19th century transformed from a conglomerate of 
chiefdoms into an empire very quickly (just in two or three decades) (see, e.g., 
Davidson 1968: 5; 1984: 161; L'vova 1984: 47; Maquet 1974: 91; Potekhin 
1954: 545; Gluckman 1987 [1940]: 29). Wars also played a prominent role in 
generating many important innovations which could be the source of ‘energy’ 
promoting the most powerful expansions and important reasons for fast military 
victories changing the World System map. In particular, there are some opin-
ions that at the beginning of the second millennium CE evolution of nomadic 
military science reached such a level of development that essentially affect- 
ted military art of other societies and civilizations of Eurasia (Khudyakov 1991: 
3). The idea that at the beginning of the 13th century Mongols won in many re-
spects due to some important innovations introduced in their military organiza-
tion has become generally accepted (see, e.g., Khrapachevsky 2005).  
One should also note here that there are significant divergences concerning 
the role of wars in the processes of state formation. In the discussions over the 
state formation, as James Ambrosino notes, ‘the role and influence of external 
social factors, i.e. such impetuses which are created by contacts with fo- 
reign societies, were practically ignored’ (Ambrosino 1995: 54). Among mo- 
dern researchers the theory of influence of wars on politogenesis and state for-
mation was most systematically and consistently developed by Robert Сarneiro 
                                                          
35 E.g., with the diffusion of horses in the Great Plains, theft of horses became the main reason of 
wars among the Amerindian peoples (such as the Omaha) in the North American prairies. Mobili-
ty of riding horses led to the point that the Utah, Apaches, Navaho, Shoshone and others began to 
raid peoples they never faced before the penetration of horses (Dennen 1995: 429).  
Andrey V. Korotayev and Leonid E. Grinin 205 
(1970, 1978, 1981, 1987, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2012; 
see also Godiner 1991; Turchin 2010, 2015; Grinin and Korotayev 2012). 
However, these ideas were not generally accepted. So, though the role of trade, 
cultural and other borrowings and influence in political anthropology is consi- 
dered more adequately to some extent, the significance of wars for processes of 
politogenesis in general and formation of the state in particular is still underes-
timated by many researchers (if not by most of them).  
It should be noted that in the late 19th century and the early 20th century 
most scholars estimated the role of wars in the state formation much higher 
than it was done later. For example, P. F. Preobrazhensky considered war as the 
inevitable concomitant of the government (2005: 154). K. Kautsky (1931) con-
trary to the Marxist doctrine had to eventually recognize that conquest was the 
most important cause for state formation. L. Gumplowicz and F. Oppenheimer 
were the most famous researchers who believed that the state formed due to 
a simple conquest of one nation by another. It is also worth mentioning Gustav 
Ratzenhofer.36 Subsequently such approaches were rejected as too primitive not 
without some reason. Nevertheless, mistakes of a century ago do not mean that 
wars did not play an important role in politogenesis. Just on the contrary. At 
least, we do not know any case when the military factor was absent (at least in 
some form) during emergence and formation of the early state. By the military 
factor we mean a situation, connected both to waging wars in this or that way 
(aggressive or defensive), and with preparation for them, or with a direct con-
quest (submission) of some communities by means of military force (for more 
details see Grinin 2007a; Grinin and Korotayev 2012). At the same time the 
emergence of many states (even in terms of creation of truly new political and 
administrative forms) often took place on the basis of military structures, cus-
toms, institutes, for example military camps of young men, troops, personal 
guard, security structures, etc. (see, e.g., L'vova 1995: 161; Orlova and L'vova 
1978; Miller 1984: 191; Bocharov 1991: 70). 
Probably it would make sense to include in the future models a mathemat-
ical description of the point that the diffusion of civilization happened not only 
due to military or settler expansion of civilizations, but also due to develop-
ment of certain zones of barbarian periphery that quite often passed civiliza-
tional threshold directly in the course of offensive on the neighboring civili- 
zation or during defense against this offensive. So, A2 period is characterized 
by transformation of the extensive part of barbarian agricultural periphery into 
civilization which was an important factor of the additional growth of urban 
population. 
                                                          
36 The review of theories of power in respect to formation of the state, see, e.g., in R. L. Car- 
neiro's works (Carneiro 1970, 2006, 2012). 
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If we take into consideration these factors, as well as factors of cyclic and 
stochastic dynamics, this may allow us to develop such mathematical models 
that may be capable of giving more exact description of the long-term dynam-
ics of the World System. 
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